The learning outcomes consist of various disciplinary and cross-disciplinary skills (or “soft skills”).
1. Disciplinary skills:
- Mastery of the concepts and reasoning related to rational and behavioral decision-making models presented in the course;
- Ability to interpret the results of the models;
- Ability to apply these models to the analysis of concrete economic phenomena and to formulate public policy recommendations;
- Critical attitude towards the models taught and their assumptions: identification of their strengths and limitations;
- Ability to perceive the links between theory and concrete reality, extend reasoning, or transfer it to a new problem.
2. Transversal skills or soft skills:
- Collaborative work management: intra-group organization, autonomy, delegation, etc.;
- Writing techniques necessary to produce a well-structured report in English with bibliographical references;
- Presentation and communication techniques: production by small groups of a video presenting the key results of a joint project in an educational manner, creation of a PowerPoint file or other materials, etc.;
- Use of written and spoken English.
This integrated teaching unit aims to enable students to master disciplinary content both through lectures by teachers—accompanied by practical work and classroom experiments—and through the implementation of a project in small groups of students. Knowledge is therefore both taught and practiced within a project, which is itself a source of learning.
The unit therefore consists of two types of supervised activities:
- courses with disciplinary content, including sessions during which students participate in economic games, either on a computer platform or in other forms;
- a “project” to be carried out in groups, with students being monitored and advised during “coaching” sessions planned during the implementation phase.
1. Disciplinary content sessions:
The first part of the disciplinary content course, Individual Decision-Making and Game Theory, covers the following topics:
In the first section, intertemporal decisions and decisions under uncertainty are analyzed from both a rational theory perspective (expected utility and expected value) and a behavioral theory perspective (beta-delta model of self-control, prospect theory). These decision models are applied to issues of income taxation, retirement savings, investments, and insurance.
In the second part, the basics of non-cooperative game theory are presented. Dominant and dominated strategies as well as Nash equilibrium are examined in the context of simultaneous games. Perfect equilibrium in subgames is presented in the context of sequential games. The solution concepts presented are applied to electoral issues and models of information asymmetry: principal-agent. If time permits, Bayesian equilibrium is discussed in the context of games with incomplete information and applied to screening.
The second part of the course, Industrial Economics, is seen as a central application of the theories and concepts covered in the first part. Behavioral theory is also used to understand and critically analyze the results. The following topics are covered:
Monopoly. Inefficiency, regulation, taxation, first-, second- and third-degree discrimination, two-part pricing, double marginalization, self-competition.
Oligopolies. In simultaneous games with homogeneous goods: Cournot and Bertrand models. In sequential games: Stackelberg and limit price models. Collusion in cooperative and non-cooperative games: pure and tacit collusion. Differentiated goods. Links between theory and regulation, particularly competition law.
Network externalities. Monopoly or duopoly platforms.
2. Project:
The projects to be carried out in small groups will consist, in particular, of:
- analyzing behaviors observed in the laboratory and proposing a behavioral model to explain deviations from rational theory;
- constructing a new model designed to perceive the interest of a particular policy;
- explaining a current event based on a sequential game that rationalizes it;
- describing a game that students model and, if applicable, play in the laboratory, verifying whether behaviors are consistent with theoretical predictions.
Part One: Individual Decision-Making and Game Theory
A. Individual Decision-Making:
Chapter 1: Preferences and Choices
Chapter 2: Intertemporal Decision-Making
Chapter 3: Decision-Making Under Uncertainty
B. Game Theory:
Chapter 1: Simultaneous Games
Chapter 2: Sequential Games
Chapter 3: Repeated Games
Chapter 4: Bayesian Games (if time permits)
Part Two: Industrial Economics
Chapter 1: Monopoly
Chapter 2: Oligopoly
Chapter 3: Monopoly Behavior
Chapter 4: Network Economies
Exercises are regularly assigned. Some exercises are corrected during practical sessions in order to consolidate what has been learned.
Courses with disciplinary content are linked to projects to be carried out by students. In addition, practical work and games organized in the laboratory illustrate—and sometimes precede—the models studied.
Courses with disciplinary content are based on slides and/or video clips. Bibliographic references are also provided for information purposes.
Links will be made between theory and current issues and challenges. In addition to presenting concepts and models, the course aims to make students active, independent, and aware of the practical issues related to the subject.
The assessment of the integrated teaching unit is continuous.
The final grade for this continuous assessment consists of two components:
A disciplinary content grade, based on written examinations: 50% of the final grade;
A project grade, based on the group project and on related individual oral assessments.
If the disciplinary grade is below 8/20, the weighting is adjusted so that the final grade is calculated as 70% of the disciplinary grade plus 30% of the project grade.
1. Disciplinary Content Grade
The student's disciplinary grade consists of two parts: a written examination during the semester and a written examination during the January examination session, both conducted as closed-book exams.
The first examination is held towards the end of October or the beginning of November. It covers individual decision-making, the first part of game theory, and the first part of industrial organization, including lectures, practical sessions, and game sessions. It accounts for half of the disciplinary grade.
The second examination is held during the January examination session. It covers the remainder of the course material and accounts for the other half of the disciplinary grade.
2. Project Grade
The individual assessment of each student is based on the written report and the video presentation produced as part of the group project.
The assessment takes into account the quality of both the content and presentation of these deliverables, as well as the student's mastery of the subject matter and the quality of their English-language communication demonstrated during the individual oral assessments held in December. English proficiency accounts for one-third of the project grade.
The assessment procedures and evaluation criteria for both deliverables are described in detail on the course Webcampus website.
If a student fails this integrated teaching unit, they may improve their disciplinary grade during the second examination session in August. In this case, the disciplinary grade is reset, and the student must take a written examination covering all material presented in the lectures, practical sessions, and game sessions. During the second session, it is not possible to retain the grade obtained in either of the two written examinations taken during the academic year.
The project grade cannot be modified. Students taking the second-session examination retain the project grade they originally obtained.
Additional useful information is available on the Webcampus website of the integrated teaching unit.
Donald Campbell, "Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information" (2nd ed.), Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Stephen Martin, Industrial Organization: a European Perspective, Oxford University Press, 2001.
A more advanced reference : Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz, Industrial Organization – Markets and strategies, second edition, Cambridge University Press, 2015.
| Training | Block | Credits | Mandatory |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bachelor in Economics and Management | 3 | 10 | Yes |