

Irreversibility, ignorance, and the intergenerational equity-efficiency trade-off

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Abstract: Two important policy goals in intergenerational problems are Pareto-efficiency and sustainability, i.e. intergenerational equity. We demonstrate that the pursuit of these goals is subject to an intergenerational equity-efficiency trade-off. Our analysis highlights two salient characteristics of sustainability problems and policy: (i) *temporal irreversibility*, i.e. the inability to revise one's past actions; and (ii) *unawareness* of future consequences of present actions in human-environment systems ("unknown unknowns"). If initially unknown sustainability problems become apparent and policy is enacted after irreversible actions were taken, policy-making faces a fundamental trade-off between Pareto-efficiency and sustainability.

JEL-Classification: D3, H23, Q01, Q38, Q56

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1 Introduction

Global environmental indicators highlight increasing degradation in many fields such as biodiversity, climate change and non-renewable resource scarcity (e.g. MEA 2005, IPCC 2007, UNEP 2012). This trend has intensified concerns about intergenerational justice and brought the concept of sustainable development in the design of public policy (e.g. WCED 1987). For instance, advocates of “climate justice” demand the equitable distribution of the benefits and damages from CO₂-emissions between developing and industrialized countries as well as between historic and future emitters (Neumayer 2000). The challenge for sustainability policy is therefore to realize an efficient and intergenerationally just allocation of resources.¹

Achieving *intergenerational* justice and efficiency simultaneously may not always be possible as redistribution might incur an equity-efficiency trade-off. Such a trade-off is familiar from the attempt to achieve *intragenerational* equity in social policy: the quest for equal utility levels (equity) incurs a (first-best) Pareto-inefficient allocation (Puterman et al. 1998, Le Grand 1990), because of different mechanisms such as incentive distortions or administrative costs. Thus, the question emerges whether policies aiming at sustainability are likewise subject to an *intergenerational* equity-efficiency trade-off.

Following the intuition from the second welfare theorem, Howarth and Norgaard (1990, 1992) show that in an overlapping-generations-model both equity and efficiency can be achieved intergenerationally, given a set of public policies such as Pigouvian taxes, intergenerational transfer payments and the assignment of resource rights between generations. Krautkraemer and Batina (1999) find that a non-decreasing-utility constraint in a model with a renewable resource can lead to Pareto-inefficient overaccumulation of the resource. In that case, all generations could be made better off by allowing decreasing utility over time. Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001) compare different policy instruments for the sustainable intergenerational distribution of resources and find that a trust fund in which all natural resources and ecosystem services are administered that can be pro-

¹Sustainability policy goes beyond mere internalization of intertemporal externalities but aims at intergenerational equity (Pezzey 2004, Baumgärtner and Quaas 2010).

duced sustainably, leads to a Pareto improvement compared to a zero-extraction policy. Considering uncertain future outcomes and preferences, Krysiak (2009) finds a trade-off between protecting future individuals from potential harm (sustainability) and thereby abstaining from actions that would have made everyone better off (efficiency).

In this paper, we investigate how an intergenerational equity-efficiency trade-off in sustainability policy emerges from the genuine character and mechanisms of intergenerational policy-making. We employ a two-non-overlapping-generations model that combines an intragenerational production decision on the use of circulating capital and a non-renewable resource, with a negative intergenerational externality. Compared to *intragenerational* policy-making, there are two salient characteristics of sustainability problems and policy: (i) temporal irreversibility (Baumgärtner 2005), i.e. the inability to revise one's past actions; (ii) "closed ignorance" (Faber et al. 1992) or "unawareness" (Dekel et al. 1998), i.e. future consequences of present actions may be "unforeseen contingencies" (Dekel et al. 1998), also known as "unknown unknowns" (Rumsfeld 2002). As such unawareness is a more fundamental form of uncertainty than risk or Knightian uncertainty, common methods such as expected utility maximization or subjective probability distributions cannot be employed.

An important case in point is the current discussion of "climate justice", and here especially equity between historic and future emitters. The first generation in the model represents historic emitters (e.g. Europe and North America) who irreversibly used non-renewable fossil fuels for the production of consumption goods and, in the process, emitted greenhouse gases that lead to significant climate change. These actions were taken under initial unawareness of the effects of greenhouse gases on climate change. The second generation in the model represents future emitters (e.g. China and India) who find diminished stocks of fossil fuels and also suffer the damages from climate change. The crucial challenge now is that climate policy is being shaped and implemented after historic production and emissions have already irreversibly taken place. While the amount of fossil fuels used for production in the past is irreversible, it is still possible to invest part of the historic emitters' output in capital for future emitters in order to address the concern for distributional equity.

We demonstrate that policy-making faces a fundamental trade-off between Pareto-efficiency and sustainability: one can achieve either one of these two goals, but not both, if policy-making is done initially under unawareness and can be adjusted only after irreversible actions were made. That is, under these conditions one falls short of capturing the maximal potential utility. For climate policy this means that any attempt to achieve climate justice between historic and future emitters necessarily leads to Pareto-inefficiency, and Pareto-efficient policies will not be equitable.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In Section 3, the normative criteria of sustainability and Pareto-efficiency are defined. Section 4 examines the effects of temporal irreversibility and unawareness on policy-making. Section 5 discusses the generality and robustness of these results. Section 6 concludes and discusses the question of what criteria could provide orientation under irreversibility and unawareness.

2 Model

There are two successive, non-overlapping generations $t = 1, 2$. Both have identical preferences over consumption C_t represented by a monotonic and concave utility function $U_t = U(C_t)$. Generation 1 is endowed with stocks of circulating capital and a non-renewable natural resource, with both stocks normalized to 1. Both generations use amounts K_t and R_t of capital and resource for the production of some intermediate good, $Y_t = F(K_t, R_t)$, where F is twice continuously differentiable, concave and exhibits positive and decreasing marginal products of both capital and resource input, $F_{KR} = F_{RK} > 0$, and capital is essential for production, $F(0, R_t) = 0$. Of course, in the absence of any regulation generation 1 will use its capital stock completely $K_1 = 1$. The intermediate good thus produced in $t = 1$ can either be directly consumed by generation 1, or it may be transferred to generation 2 as circulating capital K_2 :

$$C_1 = F(1, R_1) - K_2 \tag{1}$$

Generation 2 will use all it inherits from generation 1 in production, K_2 and $R_2 = 1 - R_1$, and it will consume the entire amount of the intermediate good produced in $t = 2$.

The first generation's use of the resource in production causes damages $D(R_1)$ to the second generation, i.e. it diminishes the availability of their social product for consumption,

$$C_2 = (1 - D(R_1))F(K_2, 1 - R_1) , \quad (2)$$

with marginal damages being positive and increasing, $D'(R_1) > 0$ and $D''(R_1) \geq 0$, and total damages in the range $0 < D(R_1) < 1$ for all $R_1 > 0$ and $D(0) = 0$. This modeling of damages is close to the DICE model where climate change damages are modeled as a fraction of GDP (Nordhaus 1992). To account for uncertainty on this actual fact, let $\kappa \in \{0, 1\}$ denote the state of information on damages. Second-generation consumption, contingent upon (un)awareness, then is:

$$C_2 = (1 - \kappa D(R_1))F(K_2, 1 - R_1) . \quad (3)$$

Initially, i.e. before actual production, generation 1 is unaware of any potential future damages, $\kappa = 0$, and is not even aware of its ignorance, but firmly believes that its resource use does not entail any future damages. That is, they are in a state of “ignorance” (sensu Faber et al. 1992). Thus, future damages are what has been called “unforeseen contingencies” (Dekel et al. 1998) or “unknown unknowns” (Rumsfeld 2002). Only after production by generation 1 has taken place, this unawareness is resolved and the full extent of damages becomes apparent, $\kappa = 1$.

A social planner aims at (1) Pareto-efficiency across generations and (2) sustainability, i.e. non-decreasing utility over time. She acts during the first generation's lifetime and shares the same information as the first generation. In order to achieve her two goals, the social planner has two policy instruments at hand: (1) she can restrict resource use of generation 1, R_1 , by an upper limit r ; (2) she can oblige generation 1 to transfer at least k out of its intermediate product, Y_1 , to generation 2 as capital, K_2 .

The exact time structure is as follows. There are three time stages: $t = 1a$, $t = 1b$ and $t = 2$. Generation 1 lives in the first two of these, generation 2 lives in the last one. In the first stage $t = 1a$, generation 1 chooses its capital input K_1 , resource

input R_1 , and capital transfer K_2 so as to maximize its own consumption C_1 subject to restrictions imposed by technology and policy. At this stage, the social planner may restrict resource use by r and make generation 1 plan with a minimal capital transfer of k . Production takes place in this stage, so that the inputs are irreversibly sunk, but as production takes time, the output is not turned out before the next stage. In the second stage $t = 1b$, output Y_1 of the intermediate good becomes available for use. At the same time, uncertainty is resolved and the future damages $D(R_1)$ from using the resource in production become fully apparent. In reaction to this information, the social planner can adjust her policy at this stage. As production by generation 1 has already taken place and resources R_1 are irreversibly sunk, she cannot revise the restriction on resource use any more. However, she can still adjust her second policy instrument and force generation 1 to transfer a higher amount k out of its intermediate good, thereby reducing generation 1's consumption C_1 and increasing generation 2's consumption C_2 . Generation 1 cannot revise its production decision anymore at this stage, as the inputs are irreversibly sunk. In the third stage $t = 2$, generation 2 derives utility from its production of the intermediate good Y_2 , which is entirely consumed in this same stage, with a reduction due to the damages caused by generation 1's resource use.

Our model is simple, yet captures the key characteristics required to discuss unawareness and irreversibility. In Section 5 below, we discuss a number of variations and extensions of this model, to demonstrate generality and robustness of our results.

3 Definitions

First, we need to distinguish three definitions of feasibility as there are irreversibility, unawareness, and at a later stage awareness about future damages in the model. Ex-ante (ex-post) feasibility refers to those allocations that are deemed feasible at $t = 1a$ under unawareness (awareness) of future damages. Reduced feasibility refers to those allocations that are feasible at $t = 1b$, i.e. under awareness, after one has acted irreversibly at $t = 1a$. In the following we denote an allocation by $X = (K_1, R_1, Y_1, C_1, K_2, R_2, Y_2, C_2)$.

Definition 1 (Feasibility)

An allocation X is called *ex-ante (ex-post) feasible* if

$$\begin{aligned} 0 \leq K_1 \leq 1, 0 \leq K_2 \leq F(K_1, R_1), R_1 + R_2 \leq 1, R_1, R_2 \geq 0, \\ C_1 = Y_1 - K_2, Y_1 = F(K_1, R_1), \\ C_2 = Y_2 = (1 - \kappa D(R_1))F(K_2, 1 - R_1) \text{ with } \kappa = 0 (\kappa = 1). \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

For any $0 \leq \bar{K}_1 \leq 1, 0 \leq \bar{R}_1 \leq 1$, and thus $\bar{Y}_1 = F(\bar{K}_1, \bar{R}_1)$, realized at $t = 1a$, an allocation is called *reduced feasible* if

$$\begin{aligned} 0 \leq K_2 \leq F(\bar{K}_1, \bar{R}_1), R_2 \leq 1 - \bar{R}_1, R_2 \geq 0, \\ C_1 = \bar{Y}_1 - K_2, \\ C_2 = Y_2 = (1 - D(\bar{R}_1))F(K_2, 1 - \bar{R}_1). \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

We understand the terms “sustainability” and “efficiency” as follows. Sustainability is defined as equal utility over time – the minimum requirement for the usual notion of sustainability as non-decreasing utility over time (Howarth 1995). With appropriate specification of the state of information, the criterion is as follows.

Definition 2 (Sustainability)

An ex-ante (ex-post) feasible allocation X is called *ex-ante (ex-post) sustainable* if and only if it yields

$$U_2 = U_1 \quad (6)$$

$$\text{where } U_1 = U(F(K_1, R_1) - K_2) \quad (7)$$

$$\text{and } U_2 = U((1 - \kappa D(R_1))F(K_2, R_2)) \text{ with } \kappa = 0 (\kappa = 1). \quad (8)$$

Similarly, efficiency is defined in an information-and-irreversibility-differentiated manner in the sense of Pareto-efficiency. *Ex-ante efficiency* means that one cannot make a generation better off without making the other worse-off under unawareness of the damages from resource use before any irreversibility in resource use has taken effect. This is the relevant efficiency criterion to guide policy-making in $t = 1a$. *Ex-post efficiency* refers to the hypothetical case where there is awareness of the damages initially, i.e. before any irreversibility has taken effect, so that policy can be fully adjusted to future

damages. Thus, it indicates the maximal potential utility in the system that is obtainable under awareness of the inevitable damages of resource use. While initial awareness of damages is hypothetical, it is nevertheless feasible to actually attain ex-post efficient allocations even under initial unawareness - which we will show below.

As a consequence of irreversible resource use in $t = 1a$, there is a reduced set of feasible actions in $t = 1b$. This irreversibility has to be taken into account by the policy-relevant efficiency criterion at this stage: *reduced-feasibility efficiency* encompasses irreversibility and awareness of damages.

Definition 3 (Efficiency)

a) An ex-ante (ex-post) feasible allocation X is called *ex-ante (ex-post) efficient* if and only if there exists no other ex-ante (ex-post) feasible allocation X' for which $U'_t \geq U_t$ for $t = 1, 2$ and $U'_t > U_t$ for at least one t .

b) Contingent on $K_1 = \overline{K}_1, R_1 = \overline{R}_1, Y_1 = \overline{Y}_1$, a reduced feasible allocation X is called *reduced-feasibility efficient* (for short: *RF-efficient*) if and only if there exists no other reduced-feasible allocation X' with $K'_1 = \overline{K}_1, R'_1 = \overline{R}_1, Y'_1 = \overline{Y}_1$ for which $U'_t \geq U_t$ for $t = 1, 2$ and $U'_t > U_t$ for at least one t .

With this definition, efficient allocations are characterized as follows.

Lemma 1

An ex-ante (ex-post, reduced) feasible allocation X is ex-ante (ex-post, reduced) efficient if and only if it meets the following conditions:

(i) Ex-ante efficiency:

$$F_R(1, R_1)F_K(K_2, 1 - R_1) = F_R(K_2, 1 - R_1), \quad (9)$$

$$F(K_2, 1 - R_1) = \overline{C} \text{ with } \overline{C} \in [0, \overline{C}^{EA, max}], \quad (10)$$

(ii) Ex-post efficiency:

$$F_R(1, R_1)F_K(K_2, 1 - R_1) - D'(R_1)F(K_2, 1 - R_1)/(1 - D(R_1)) = F_R(K_2, 1 - R_1), \quad (11)$$

$$(1 - D(R_1))F(K_2, 1 - R_1) = \bar{C} \quad \text{with } \bar{C} \in [0, \bar{C}^{EP, max}], \quad (12)$$

(iii) Reduced-feasibility efficiency:

$$(1 - D(\bar{R}_1))F(K_2, 1 - \bar{R}_1) = \bar{C} \quad \text{with } \bar{C} \in [0, \bar{C}^{RF, max}], \quad (13)$$

where \bar{C} is an intergenerational distribution parameter with $\bar{C} \in [0, \bar{C}^{i, max}]$, $i \in \{EA, EP, RF\}$.

Proof. See Appendix A.1. □

As consumption is the only good in the model, the intergenerational distribution parameter \bar{C} determines not only consumption, but also utility levels. It can attain any value between 0 (all potential utility in this system is with generation 1, none with generation 2) and some $\bar{C}^{i, max}$ (all potential utility is with generation 2, none with generation 1), so that there exist infinitely many efficient allocations satisfying these characterizations. Conditions (9), and (11) state that the marginal gain in consumption for generation 2 from either of the following two alternative uses of the resource should be equal: (LHS) giving the additional resource to generation 1 as input into production, and then transferring the entire additional amount of the intermediate good thus produced as capital into generation 2's production; (RHS) giving the additional resource directly to generation 2 as input into their production. While Condition (9) expresses this without taking damages into account ($\kappa = 0$), Condition (11) states the same for the case where the damages are known ($\kappa = 1$) and taken into account from the beginning.² Condition (13) states that varying \bar{C} determines the RF-efficient capital transfer K_2 which generates the set of RF-efficient allocations.

One can illustrate the efficient allocations through continuous and monotonically decreasing utility frontiers $U_2(U_1)$ in utility space (Figure 1). Unawareness (awareness)

²As (11) differs from (9), ex-ante efficient allocations are, in general, ex-post inefficient.

at $t = 1a$ about the damages yields the ex-ante (ex-post) utility frontier which runs from $U_2^{EA,max}$ ($U_2^{EP,max}$) to U_1^{max} .

Lemma 2

The ex-post utility frontier is the envelope of the reduced-feasibility utility frontiers that result for all $\overline{R}_1 \in [0, 1]$.

Proof. See Appendix A.2. □

The ex-post utility frontier forms the envelope of all RF-utility frontiers. The RF-utility frontier depends on the actual realization of $R_1 = \overline{R}_1$ at $t = 1a$ and runs from $U_2^{RF,max}$ to $U_1^{RF,max}$. Due to the envelope property of the ex-post frontier and unawareness about factual damages, the ex-ante and ex-post frontiers both Pareto-dominate the RF-utility frontier. In the same figure, sustainable allocations are represented as a 45°-line from the axes.

4 Results

Under a laissez-faire policy the first generation will use up its entire circulating capital $K_1^0 = 1$, exploit the total amount of the resource $R_1^0 = 1$, and will not provide a capital transfer to the next generation, $K_2^0 = 0$. As a consequence, the first generation is better-off than the second one $U_1^0 > U_2^0$, as $C_1^0 = F(1, 1) > 0$ and $C_2^0 = F(0, 0) = 0$ (illustrated by X^0 in Figure 1). While this laissez-faire allocation is efficient by any notion of efficiency, it is not sustainable. This motivates sustainability policy by the social planner.

Sustainability policy has to follow the time structure laid out in Section 2. At $t = 1a$, the social planner devises a policy mix of restrictions on resource use and a capital transfer which should lead to an ex-ante efficient and ex-ante sustainable allocation.

Proposition 1 (Ex-ante sustainable and ex-ante efficient policy)

At time $t = 1a$, there exists a unique policy mix (\tilde{r}, \tilde{k}) that leads to an allocation \tilde{X} which is both ex-ante sustainable and ex-ante efficient. It is characterized by the

following necessary and sufficient conditions:

$$F_R(1, \tilde{r})F_K(\tilde{k}, 1 - \tilde{r}) = F_R(\tilde{k}, 1 - \tilde{r}) , \quad (14)$$

$$F(1, \tilde{r}) - \tilde{k} = F(\tilde{k}, 1 - \tilde{r}) . \quad (15)$$

Proof. See Appendix A.3. □

In climate policy, the policy mix (\tilde{r}, \tilde{k}) refers to the situation under which production and consumption of the historic emitters took place. The use of fossil fuels was thought to be harmless as the effects of greenhouse gases on the atmosphere were unknown unknowns. Future emitters were thought to be at least equally well-off due to capital transfers and the ability to use the remaining fossil fuels. Yet, with the first report of the IPCC (1990) there was strong evidence that anthropogenic climate change was real and of relevant magnitude, and estimates of the damages due to historic greenhouse-gas emissions became available.

Thus, in the second stage $t = 1b$ the damages from resource use $D(R_1)$ are known, $\kappa = 1$. Obviously, not adapting the policy mix (\tilde{r}, \tilde{k}) to the new findings would result in an ex-post unsustainable allocation, with generation 2 worse-off than generation 1, as $U(F(1, \tilde{r}) - \tilde{k}) > U((1 - D(\tilde{r}))F(\tilde{k}, 1 - \tilde{r}))$. Therefore, the social planner must adapt her policy mix to ensure ex-post sustainability. However, production of the first generation of $\tilde{Y}_1 = F(\tilde{K}_1, \tilde{R}_1)$ has already taken place and inputs are irreversibly sunk. The only viable instrument is, therefore, to increase the minimum transfer of capital from generation 1 to generation 2, $k > \tilde{k}$. As this does not allow the achievement of ex-post efficiency, the policy maker faces the following fundamental sustainability-efficiency trade-off.

Proposition 2 (Sustainability-efficiency trade-off)

In general, and in particular for the ex-ante efficient and ex-ante sustainable policy (\tilde{r}, \tilde{k}) , policy-making at time $t = 1b$ faces the following trade-off between ex-post efficiency and ex-post sustainability:

- (i) there exists no policy mix $(r = \tilde{r}, k)$ that yields an allocation that is both ex-post efficient and ex-post sustainable, but

- (ii) there exists a unique policy mix $(\hat{r} = \tilde{r}, \hat{k})$ with $\hat{k} > \tilde{k}$ that yields an allocation \hat{X} that is ex-post sustainable but not ex-post efficient, and
- (iii) there exists another unique policy mix $(r^* = \tilde{r}, k^*)$ with $k^* < \tilde{k}$ that yields an allocation X^* that is ex-post efficient but not ex-post sustainable.

Proof. See Appendix A.4. □

The intuition behind this result is as follows. Despite the damages the social planner can still achieve an ex-post sustainable allocation at time $t = 1b$ by adjusting her policy mix (Proposition 2 ii). This requires generation 1 to transfer more of its intermediate product as circulating capital to the second generation than originally planned, $\hat{k} > \tilde{k}$. As this transfer would exceed the one originally deemed necessary for sustainability and generation 1's production is irreversible, Condition (11) for ex-post efficiency is violated. Still, sustainability is achieved in spite of the damages and the irreversibility of resource use, as $U(\hat{C}_1) = U(F(1, \tilde{r}) - \hat{k}) = U((1 - D(\tilde{r}))F(\hat{k}, 1 - \tilde{r})) = U(\hat{C}_2)$. In climate policy this corresponds to a higher transfer of capital from historic to future emitters to compensate them for (previously unknown) damages from climate change.

Alternatively, an ex-post efficient allocation X^* can be achieved, by decreasing the capital transfer in $t = 1b$, i.e. $k^* < \tilde{k}$ and $r^* = \tilde{r}$ (Proposition 2 iii). It is, however, not ex-post sustainable as $U(C_1^*) = U(F(1, r^*) - k^*) > U((1 - D(r^*))F(k^*, 1 - r^*)) = U(C_2^*)$. For climate policy this would mean a lower capital transfer and therefore no compensation to future emitters for damages from climate change. As the minimum capital transfer k is the only remaining policy variable at time $t = 1b$, and $k = \hat{k}$ would ensure ex-post sustainability while any $k \neq \tilde{k}$ leads to ex-post inefficiency, there exists no k that achieves both ex-post sustainability and ex-post efficiency (Proposition 2 i).

Despite this fundamental trade-off in policy-making with the two policy instruments studied here – a limit r on resource use by generation 1 and a minimum capital transfer k from generation 1 to generation 2 – there exists, in principle, a reduced feasible allocation that is both ex-post efficient and ex-post sustainable.

Proposition 3 (Bliss)

There exists a unique policy mix (r^{Bliss}, k^{Bliss}) that yields an ex-post efficient and ex-post sustainable allocation X^{Bliss} which is reduced feasible, that is, feasible under unawareness and irreversibility.

Proof. See Appendix A.5. □

This result mirrors the one from the intragenerational equity-efficiency trade-off where a first-best efficient and equitable allocation is feasible under all physical constraints, but not achievable with given instruments of social policy.




Figure 1: Illustration in the space of future utility U_2 and present utility U_1 of sustainable allocations (45°-line); ex-ante efficient allocations (EA, dashed); ex-post efficient allocations (EP, dotted), including the ex-post efficient and ex-post sustainable allocation X^{Bliss} ; and reduced-feasibility efficient allocations (RF, solid), highlighting the trade-off between an ex-post sustainable allocation \hat{X} and an ex-post efficient allocation X^* .

The various policies are illustrated with regard to sustainability and efficiency in Figure 1. The laissez-faire allocation X^0 without policy interference is unsustainable, but ex-ante and ex-post efficient. The ex-ante efficient and ex-ante sustainable allocation \tilde{X} that results from policy (\tilde{r}, \tilde{k}) in $t = 1a$ lies at the intersection of the ex-ante utility frontier (dashed curve) with the sustainability line (45°-line). When damages to generation 2 become apparent in $t = 1b$ and the capital transfer is reduced to k^* , this allocation becomes the ex-post efficient, yet ex-post unsustainable allocation X^* .

All possible redistributions through a capital transfer k from generation 1 to generation 2 at $t = 1b$ after irreversibility in resource use \tilde{r} has taken effect, generate the RF-utility frontier (solid curve). Depending on whether the transfer is increased $k > \tilde{k}$ or decreased $k < \tilde{k}$ one moves along the RF-utility frontier closer or further away from the sustainability line. The RF-utility frontier lies strictly below the ex-post utility frontier (dotted curve) except at X^* where both coincide (for $k = k^*$). This RF-utility frontier allows attaining the ex-post sustainable, yet ex-post inefficient allocation \hat{X} . Beyond the RF-utility frontier, there exists the ex-post sustainable and ex-post efficient allocation X^{Bliss} at the intersection of the ex-post utility frontier and the sustainability line.

The trade-off between ex-post sustainability and ex-post efficiency at stage $t = 1b$ consists in the impossibility to reach both goals at once, i.e. the social planner must choose between the ex-post efficient allocation X^* and the ex-post sustainable allocation \hat{X} . She can also choose any combination of the two on the RF-utility frontier. Without irreversibility or unawareness there would be no such trade-off: if there were no irreversibility the ex-post utility frontier would be attainable in $t = 1b$ as the policy mix could easily be adjusted to the previously unknown damages. If there was no unawareness of future damages the social planner would simply choose a sustainable allocation on the ex-post utility frontier in $t = 1a$. Here, irreversibility would not be an issue as sustainability problems would be apparent from the very beginning.

On a more general note, Figure 1 illustrates the welfare loss due to the combination of irreversibility and unawareness. This is represented as the difference between the EP-utility frontier that indicates the maximal potential utility and the RF-utility frontier

that indicates achievable allocations after irreversible actions were taken. It becomes clear that every irreversible action (such as e.g. the depletion of natural resource stocks, or the generation of persistent pollutants and wastes) implies a welfare loss if an initially unknown negative effect becomes apparent at a later stage. This is due to the fact that correcting an irreversible decision afterwards is done with even more limited means as some resources have irreversibly been used.

5 Discussion

In this section, we discuss a number of common variations and extensions of the model (cf. Section 2) to show the generality and robustness of our results.

Positive externality

In the model there is unawareness about a negative intergenerational externality that originates from resource use. If there is unawareness about a positive externality that benefits the second generation, e.g. climate change might be beneficial to (at least some parts of) future generations (cf. Tol 2009), policy runs into the same trade-off: with initial use of the resource being too low, there is still a trade-off between ex-post efficiency and ex-post sustainability after irreversibility has taken effect and unawareness is resolved. In case there are positive and negative externalities from resource use the net of the two matters – and as long they do not cancel out the same result obtains.

Sustainability as non-decreasing utility

For reasons of uniqueness we chose a definition of sustainability as equal utility between generations. If sustainability is defined more generally as non-decreasing utility over time (as e.g. by Solow 1974, Hartwick 1977, Solow 1986, Howarth 1995, Arrow et al. 2004), the equity-efficiency trade-off persists up to a boundary case. If resource use in the first period is such that the intersection between the resulting RF-utility frontier and the EP-utility frontier coincides with the allocation X^{Bliss} , there is no trade-off between ex-post efficiency and ex-post sustainability. Any resource use by the first generation below this level also leads to RF-utility frontiers which include an ex-post sustainable and ex-post efficient allocation. Yet, under unawareness there is no information so as to characterize

this boundary case and achieving sustainability and efficiency simultaneously would be mere chance.

Infinite number of generations

In the model there are two successive generations, but our results hold for an infinite number of generations (as assumed by e.g. Svenson 1980, Solow 1986, Asheim and Tun-
godden 2004) as long as at least one of them is subject to unawareness and irreversibility. If this generation takes an irreversible decision under unawareness, policy-making – irre-
spective of the number of generations – subsequently faces the trade-off between ex-post efficiency and ex-post sustainability.

Overlapping generations

In the model generations do not overlap. An overlapping-generations model would split the lifetime of each generation in a young production stage and an old consumption stage with an overlap between the two generations (e.g. Howarth and Norgaard 1992, Burton 1993, Marini and Scaramozzino 1995, Howarth 1998). If the first generation takes irreversible production decisions under unawareness in its young production stage, it cannot change its past production in its consumption stage – even if it overlaps with the successive generation. In fact this is quite close to the model where the lifetime of generation 1 is split in two periods (1a, 1b). This means that as long as irreversibility and unawareness persist in the production decision of the first generation, policy-making faces an equity-efficiency trade-off with overlapping generations.

Amenity value and other services of the resource

If the first generation directly draws utility from the resource stock, e.g. due to some amenity value (e.g. Krautkraemer 1985), it will of course reduce its resource use. Yet, if there is unawareness about the intergenerational externality, policy cannot efficiently adapt and overuse of the resource remains. Other services of the resource stock affect resource use of the first generation similarly, but this cannot internalize the unknown damages from resource use. Here, the degree of substitutability between amenity values and consumption does not matter (as in the discussion of weak vs. strong sustainability, e.g. Neumayer 1999) as long as the resource is used as a production input at least to some extent.

Non-resource-based goods

The model features one single aggregate consumption good which is produced from the resource. In particular, there is no non-resource-based good that could serve as a substitute for consumption, such as e.g. leisure in the leisure-consumption model (e.g. Sandmo 1981). If a generation optimizes intragenerationally with respect to several goods, the combination of irreversibility and unawareness in one of those goods violates first-best efficiency (leading to an equity-efficiency trade-off) just as with resource use in the model presented above.

Renewable resource

The model features a non-renewable resource. This makes sustainability impossible over an infinite time-horizon. If the natural resource is renewable (e.g. Clark 2010), the social planner incorporate this in her ex-ante efficient and ex-ante sustainable policy. If the use or consumption of this resource is irreversible and causes an ex-ante unforeseen effect, there exists an equity-efficiency trade-off.

Fixed capital

If capital is not used up in production process, but can be accumulated (as e.g. in the model due to Dasgupta and Heal 1974, Solow 1974, Stiglitz 1974) unawareness still poses a problem for efficiency. For example, an efficient consumption path with a respective built-up in capital cannot be adjusted to an intergenerational externality without losing efficiency if it becomes apparent after irreversibility has taken effect.

Technical progress

An important factor in intertemporal problems is technical progress which benefits future generations (e.g. Aghion and Howitt 1998: Ch. 5, Schou 2002, Acemoglu et al. 2012). Technical progress, to the extent that it is known, would be included in the ex-ante efficient and ex-ante sustainable policy by the social planner. With exogenous technical progress this policy redistributes less resource and capital to the second generation ex ante. With endogenous technical progress this policy requires the first generation to invest ex ante in technical progress. But both variants of technical progress do not compensate the future generation for an unknown externality. If there is unawareness of technical progress this leads to the discussion of a positive externality from above.

Source of irreversibility

In the model, the use of the natural resource in production is irreversible. Other sources of irreversibility are imaginable. For instance, in a leisure-consumption model where individuals produce consumption from labor as the sole production factor (e.g. Sandmo 1981), time is irreversible. Thus, leisure cannot be transferred over time but is irreversibly used by each generation. In this model, if the social planner surprises generation by announcing an unforeseen tax or transfer (e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980: 68) after leisure has irreversibly been enjoyed, there exists an intergenerational equity-efficiency trade-off.

Object of unawareness

In the model there is unawareness of future damages and, thus, of production possibilities. Other objects of potential unawareness include future preferences, resource extraction costs or resource stock size. Obviously, if unawareness of either of these objects is resolved after irreversible production has taken place, the trade-off between ex-post sustainability and ex-post efficiency remains.

Altruism

The role of altruism for long-run sustainability is often discussed (e.g. Jouvét et al. 2000, Bréchet and Lambrecht 2009). In our model the social planner, rather than the generations, pursues the normative criteria of efficiency and sustainability. If the first generation is altruistic towards the second generation, it would by itself provide a transfer to the future. Yet, due to unawareness, this voluntary transfer does not account for the negative externality from resource use. Subsequently, irreversibility in production does not allow the altruistic first generation to readjust which leads to the equity-efficiency trade-off as before.

Kind of transfer

In distributional problems the kind of transfer matters, i.e. whether income, consumption, or capital is redistributed. Our model uses a transfer of capital which is a durable good that can be redistributed across generations. Other kinds of transfers such as income or consumption would lead to the same result: if there is irreversibility in production and unawareness about future damages, none of these transfers can ensure

equity and efficiency simultaneously.

This discussion highlights the importance of the combination of unawareness and irreversibility as the key characteristics driving the results. As for all other assumptions of the model, the results are robust to a large number of variations and extensions.

6 Conclusion

We have studied the question of whether there exists a mechanism genuine to intergenerational policy-making that causes an intergenerational equity-efficiency trade-off. We found that sustainability policy that acts under a combination of temporal irreversibility and unawareness faces such a trade-off between efficiency across generations and intergenerational equity. Hence, in general it falls short of capturing the maximal potential utility from the system.

This result is relevant for current climate policy. Policies that want to achieve sustainability after damages were initially unknown (unawareness) must respect that past actions cannot be undone (temporal irreversibility), and that redistribution therefore faces a trade-off between efficiency and sustainability. For the case of climate justice – where climate policy is enacted after production and emissions have already irreversibly taken place – this means that there is a trade-off between equity and efficiency among historic and future emitters. Policymakers therefore need to be aware of the fact that pursuing sustainability as the overriding priority sacrifices efficiency, and that prudent policy-making requires a prior debate on how to balance these two conflicting goals.

Our result is very general and holds way beyond the model studied here and beyond the case of climate policy. For, one simply cannot think of intergenerational policy-making that is *not* subject to irreversibility and unawareness. Hence, any intergenerational policy-making is, in general, subject to an intergenerational equity-efficiency trade-off. For instance, this holds also for industrial and technology policy, or the design of pension systems.

This raises the question of how one should act in the face of irreversibility and

unawareness. Policy that explicitly aims at the two normative objectives of equity and efficiency at all stages of history cannot attain both of them. Yet, as a “bliss” allocation is actually feasible, even under irreversibility and unawareness, one would expect relevant normative criteria to guide us there. But in the second-best world in which one necessarily acts, one is without orientation with respect to the two normative objectives of equity and efficiency.

Against this background, several conclusions emerge: First, beware of irreversibility. As irreversibility reduces the possibilities of reacting to unforeseen developments – both negative and positive – one would be better off with less irreversibility. And irreversibility may indeed be evident ex-ante and a matter of choice. For example, technologies of electricity production, e.g. from wind or nuclear fuels, clearly differ in terms of irreversibility.

Second, beware of unawareness. As with irreversibility, unawareness may be evident ex-ante and a matter of choice. For instance, unawareness may be reducible or not (Faber et al. 1992). In the latter case, there is nothing one can do to reduce unawareness. In the former case, research may allow the reduction of unawareness – to narrow the gap between ex-post and ex-ante frontiers. As an example, in the beginning of the industrialization, people were unaware about the potential consequences of releasing carbon emissions into the atmosphere, and they were not even aware of their unawareness. Later, in the 1950s, it became evident to some that there was unawareness about the potential consequences of releasing carbon emissions into the atmosphere. Climate research since then has outlined these potential states of the world, thus reducing unawareness.

Third, in instances of unawareness orientation can come from weaker normative objectives. They should build on conceptions and variables of which one is not fundamentally unaware, but of which one can – with good epistemological reasons – believe to have more knowledge. For example, sustainability as considered here – non-declining utility over time – is a very knowledge-demanding criterion, because it requires full knowledge of future preferences, production technology, system dynamics, etc. A weaker criterion of sustainability could be that of equal satisfaction of basic needs (sensu WCED 1987).

Knowledge demand for assessing this criterion is considerably lower, and less prone to fundamental unawareness, as one does not need to know individual preferences. Likewise, one could consider weaker and less knowledge-demanding criteria of efficiency than Pareto-efficiency, e.g. non-wastefulness in production and transfer.

Fourth, the fundamental problem that unawareness poses for the evaluation of consequences of one's action, does not exist in deontological ethics, which justifies actions without relying on information about their consequences. Some have suggested such deontological criteria especially with regard to sustainability (e.g. Howarth 1995).

Nevertheless, analyzing the efficiency of instruments in sustainability policy (as e.g. in Gerlagh and Keyzer 2001) is still indispensable. Describing and quantifying the trade-offs between sustainability and efficiency helps to outline the limits for the design of concrete policies. After all, we do not want to pay more for sustainability than necessary – even in the face of irreversibility and unawareness.

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Appendix

A.1 Proof of Lemma 1

As consumption is the only good in the model, Pareto-efficiency can be analyzed on the level of consumption. Thus, the intergenerational distribution parameter \bar{C} equally determines the utility levels.

(i) An ex-ante feasible ex-ante efficient allocation is the solution to

$$\max_{K_1, R_1, K_2, R_2} C_1 \text{ s.t. } C_2 \geq \bar{C}, C_1 = F(K_1, R_1) - K_2, C_2 = F(K_2, R_2), R_1 + R_2 = 1, K_1 = 1, \quad (\text{A.16})$$

with the Lagrangian $\mathfrak{L} = F(1, R_1) - K_2 + \lambda_1(F(K_2, 1 - R_1) - \bar{C})$. Obviously, in the optimal solution the constraint $C_2 \geq \bar{C}$ must hold with equality. The necessary first order conditions then are:

$$\frac{\partial \mathfrak{L}}{\partial R_1} = F_R(1, R_1) + \lambda_1 F_R(K_2, 1 - R_1)(-1) = 0, \quad (\text{A.17})$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathfrak{L}}{\partial K_2} = (-1) + \lambda_1 F_K(K_2, 1 - R_1) = 0, \quad (\text{A.18})$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathfrak{L}}{\partial \lambda_1} = F(K_2, 1 - R_1) - \bar{C} = 0. \quad (\text{A.19})$$

Rearranging (A.17) and (A.18) and eliminating λ_1 by dividing the two, one arrives at (9). (A.19) yields (10). These conditions are also sufficient, as the optimization problem (A.16) is strictly convex.

(ii) An ex-post feasible ex-post efficient allocation is the solution to

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{K_1, R_1, K_2, R_2} C_1 \text{ s.t. } C_2 \geq \bar{C}, C_1 = F(K_1, R_1) - K_2, \\ C_2 = (1 - D(R_1))F(K_2, R_2), R_1 + R_2 = 1, K_1 = 1, \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.20})$$

with the Lagrangian $\mathfrak{L} = F(1, R_1) - K_2 + \lambda_2((1 - D(R_1))F(K_2, 1 - R_1) - \bar{C})$. Obviously, in the optimal solution the constraint $C_2 \geq \bar{C}$ must hold with equality. The necessary first order conditions then are:

$$\frac{\partial \mathfrak{L}}{\partial R_1} = F_R(1, R_1) + \lambda_2(-D'(R_1)F(K_2, 1 - R_1) + (1 - D(R_1))F(K_2, 1 - R_1)(-1)) \quad (\text{A.21})$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathfrak{L}}{\partial K_2} = (-1) + \lambda_2(1 - D(R_1))F_K(K_2, 1 - R_1) = 0, \quad (\text{A.22})$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathfrak{L}}{\partial \lambda_1} = (1 - D(R_1))F(K_2, 1 - R_1) - \bar{C} = 0. \quad (\text{A.23})$$

Rearranging (A.21) and (A.22) and eliminating λ_1 by dividing the two, one arrives at (11). (A.23) yields (12). These conditions are also sufficient, as the optimization problem (A.20) is strictly convex.

(iii) A reduced feasible RF-efficient allocation with given $K_1 = \bar{K}_1, R_1 = \bar{R}_1$ is the solution to

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{K_2} C_1 \text{ s.t. } C_2 \geq \bar{C}, C_1 = F(\bar{K}_1, \bar{R}_1) - K_2, C_2 = (1 - D(\bar{R}_1))F(K_2, \bar{R}_2), \\ \bar{R}_1 + \bar{R}_2 = 1, \bar{K}_1 = 1, 0 \leq K_2 \leq K_2^{RF, max} = F(\bar{K}_1, \bar{R}_1) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.24})$$

with the Lagrangian $\mathfrak{L} = F(1, \bar{R}_1) - K_2 + \lambda((1 - D(\bar{R}_1))F(K_2, 1 - \bar{R}_1) - \bar{C})$. Obviously, in the optimal solution the constraint $C_2 \geq \bar{C}$ must hold with equality. The necessary first order conditions then are:

$$\frac{\partial \mathfrak{L}}{\partial K_2} = -1 + \lambda(1 - D(\bar{R}_1))F_K(K_2, 1 - \bar{R}_1) = 0, \quad (\text{A.25})$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathfrak{L}}{\partial \lambda} = (1 - D(\bar{R}_1))F(K_2, 1 - \bar{R}_1) - \bar{C} = 0, \quad (\text{A.26})$$

Choosing \bar{C} determines K_2 in (A.26). K_2 determines λ in (A.25). Thus, (A.26) yields (13). Varying \bar{C} between $\bar{C}^{min} = 0$ and $\bar{C}^{RF,max}$ by varying K_2 between 0 and $K_2^{max} = F(\bar{K}_1, \bar{R}_1)$ generates the set of RF-efficient allocations.

A.2 Proof of Lemma 2

Decision problem (A.20) is the envelope to decision problem (A.24). Note, that this analysis holds equally for utility as consumption is the only good in the model. To prove this, define the value function $v(K_2)$ as the solution to the optimization problem (A.20):

$$v(K_2) = F(1, R_1(K_2)) - K_2. \quad (\text{A.27})$$

The derivative of $v(K_2)$ is:

$$\frac{\partial v(K_2)}{\partial K_2} = F_R(1, R_1) \frac{\partial R_1}{\partial K_2} + (-1) \quad (\text{A.28})$$

From (A.20) define constraint function $g(R_1(K_2), K_2) = (1 - D(R_1(K_2)))F(K_2, 1 - R_1(K_2)) - \bar{C}$ which is 0 for all K_2 .

From (A.21) we know:

$$F_R(1, R_1) = \lambda_2 \frac{\partial g(R_1(K_2), K_2)}{\partial R_1} \quad (\text{A.29})$$

Inserting this into (A.28) leads to

$$\frac{\partial v(K_2)}{\partial K_2} = \lambda_2 \frac{\partial g(R_1(K_2), K_2)}{\partial R_1} \frac{\partial R_1}{\partial K_2} + (-1) \quad (\text{A.30})$$

As $dg(R_1(K_2), K_2)/dK_2 = 0$ this leads to:

$$\frac{\partial g(R_1(K_2), K_2)}{\partial R_1} \frac{\partial R_1}{\partial K_2} = - \frac{\partial g(R_1(K_2), K_2)}{\partial K_2} \quad (\text{A.31})$$

Inserting this into (A.30) this leads to:

$$\frac{\partial v(K_2)}{\partial K_2} = -1 - \lambda_2 \frac{\partial g(R_1(K_2), K_2)}{\partial K_2} = -1 - \lambda_2((1 - D(R_1))F_K(K_2, 1 - R_1)) \quad (\text{A.32})$$

For Pareto-efficiency the value function must be maximized which requires $\partial v(R_1^*, K_2)/\partial K_2 = 0$ and results the same condition as in (A.25). Therefore, the ex-post utility frontier forms the envelope of the RF-utility frontier.

A.3 Proof of Proposition 1

At time $t = 1a$, the social planner sets (r, k) , expecting – given her unawareness, $\kappa = 0$ – that both generations, when maximizing their individual consumption subject to constraints from technology and policy, end up in an allocation $X = (K_1, R_1, Y_1, C_1, K_2, R_2, Y_2, C_2)$ with

$$C_1 = F(1, r) - k \tag{A.33}$$

$$C_2 = F(k, 1 - r) . \tag{A.34}$$

Note, that this analysis holds equally for utility as consumption is the only good in the model. The social planner chooses (r, k) so that X is ex-ante efficient, i.e. it satisfies Conditions (9) and (10) (Lemma 1(i)), and ex-ante sustainable, i.e. it fulfills Condition (6) (Definition 2). With (A.33),(A.34) these conditions are

$$F(k, 1 - r) = F(1, r) - k \tag{A.35}$$

$$F_R(1, r)F_K(k, 1 - r) = F_R(k, 1 - r), \tag{A.36}$$

$$F(k, 1 - r) = \bar{C} . \tag{A.37}$$

There exists a unique value of $\bar{C} \in [0, \bar{C}^{EA, max}]$ so that this system can be solved for (\tilde{r}, \tilde{k}) ; with this value of \bar{C} , (A.35)–(A.37) reduce to Conditions (14),(15) and (\tilde{r}, \tilde{k}) is uniquely determined. To see this, note that \bar{C} determines (r, k) . Think of C_1 as a function of C_2 (defined by A.33, A.34, A.36, A.37 through variation of \bar{C} , where $\bar{C} = C_2$ as shown in Appendix A.1(i)) and consider first the minimal and maximal achievable consumption levels, indicated by $C_t^{EA, min}$ and $C_t^{EA, max}$, respectively. Setting $\bar{C} = 0$ implies $k^{EA, min} = 0$ and $r^{EA, min} = 1$, which yields $C_1^{EA, max} = F(1, 1) > 0$ and $C_2^{EA, min} = F(0, 0) = 0$. Setting $\bar{C} = \bar{C}^{EA, max}$ implies $k^{EA, max} = F(1, r^{EA, max})$. Inserting $k^{EA, max}$ into (A.36) uniquely yields $r^{EA, max}$, so that $C_1^{EA, min} = F(1, r^{EA, max}) - k^{EA, max} = 0$ and $C_2^{EA, max} = F(k^{EA, max}, 1 - r^{EA, max}) > 0$. By (A.37) we know that $dk/d\bar{C} = 1/F_K > 0$ and $dr/d\bar{C} = -1/F_R < 0$. As $F(\cdot, \cdot)$ is concave (by assumption) and C_1 is decreased linearly by increasing k as in (1), increasing k and reducing r by the ex-ante efficient mix (A.36) via increasing \bar{C} from 0 to $\bar{C}^{EA, max}$ decreases C_1

monotonically from $C_1^{EA,max}$ to 0. As all functions involved are continuous $C_1(\bar{C})$ is continuous. Increasing \bar{C} simultaneously increases C_2 continuously and monotonically from 0 to $C_2^{EA,max}$. Thus, by the intermediate value theorem and monotonicity, there exists a unique value of \bar{C} so that the corresponding (\tilde{r}, \tilde{k}) yields $C_1 = C_2$, i.e. it fulfills (A.35).

A.4 Proof of Proposition 2

At time $t = 1b$, resource use $\tilde{r} = \tilde{R}_1$ is already irreversibly sunk in production and only the transfer of capital k can be adjusted. Note, that this analysis holds equally for utility as consumption is the only good in the model.

(i) As noted in Appendix A.3 (\tilde{r}, \tilde{k}) meets Condition (9) so $F_R(1, \tilde{r})F_K(\tilde{k}, 1 - \tilde{r}) = F_R(\tilde{r}, 1 - \tilde{r})$. Thus, (\tilde{r}, \tilde{k}) cannot meet Condition (11) for ex-post efficiency as $F_R(1, \tilde{r})F_K(\tilde{k}, 1 - \tilde{r}) - D'(\tilde{r})F(\tilde{k}, 1 - \tilde{r})/(1 - D(\tilde{r})) < F_R(\tilde{k}, 1 - \tilde{r})$. Furthermore, (\tilde{r}, \tilde{k}) does not meet Condition (10) for ex-ante efficiency due to the damages $D(R_1)$. Thus, no adaptation of the ex-ante efficient and ex-ante sustainable policy (\tilde{r}, \tilde{k}) yields an allocation that is ex-ante and ex-post inefficient and ex-post unsustainable as

$$F(1, \tilde{r}) - \tilde{k} > (1 - D(\tilde{r}))F(\tilde{k}, 1 - \tilde{r}) \quad (\text{A.38})$$

Increasing k to some $k^b > \tilde{k}$ to move towards a sustainable allocation does not allow to meet Condition (11). This is due to positive decreasing marginal utility in both inputs, which leads to: $F_R(1, \tilde{r})F_K(k^b, 1 - \tilde{r}) - D'(\tilde{r})F(k^b, 1 - \tilde{r})/(1 - D(\tilde{r})) < F_R(1, \tilde{r})F_K(\tilde{k}, 1 - \tilde{r}) - D'(\tilde{r})F(\tilde{k}, 1 - \tilde{r})/(1 - D(\tilde{r})) < F_R(\tilde{k}, 1 - \tilde{r}) < F_R(k^b, 1 - \tilde{r})$. Therefore, there exists no policy that is ex-post efficient and ex-post sustainable.

(ii) At time $t = 1b$ the social planner needs to resort to a higher capital transfer $k > \tilde{k}$ in her policy (\tilde{r}, k) to achieve sustainability due to the damages $D(\tilde{r})$. As shown in (A.38) the second generation's consumption level is, $\hat{C}_2 = (1 - D(\tilde{r}))F(k, 1 - \tilde{r})$. With this condition for the behavior of the second generation and the irreversible production decision $\tilde{Y}_1 = F(1, \tilde{r})$ the effect of the level of capital transfer on utility can be derived

$$\text{for generation 1: } \hat{C}_1 = F(1, \tilde{r}) - k, \quad (\text{A.39})$$

$$\text{for generation 2: } \hat{C}_2 = (1 - D(\tilde{r}))F(k, 1 - \tilde{r}). \quad (\text{A.40})$$

The social planner sets k so that X is ex-post sustainable, i.e. it fulfills Condition (6) (Definition 2) and is on the RF-utility frontier, i.e. it fulfills Conditions (A.39) and (A.40). As the production function is concave an increase of k monotonically decreases the generation 1's consumption/utility level (A.39) while monotonically increasing the generation 2's consumption/utility level (A.40). Think of $C_1 - C_2$ as a function of k and consider minimal and maximal achievable consumption levels $C_t^{RF,min}$, $C_t^{RF,max}$ along the RF-utility frontier in (A.39) and (A.40) with irreversible resource inputs $\tilde{r} = \tilde{R}_1$ and $1 - \tilde{r} = \tilde{R}_2$. Setting $k = 0$ leads to $C_1^{RF,max} = F(1, \tilde{r}) > 0$ and $C_2^{RF,min} = (1 - D(\tilde{r}))F(0, 1 - \tilde{r}) = 0$. Setting $k = k^{RF,max}$ leads to, $C_1^{RF,min} = F(1, \tilde{r}) - k^{RF,max} = 0$ and $C_2^{RF,max} = (1 - D(\tilde{r}))F(k^{RF,max}, 1 - \tilde{r}) > 0$. As $F(K_t, R_t)$ is concave and C_1 is reduced linearly by increasing k , increasing k decreases $C_1 - C_2$ monotonically from $C_1^{RF,max} - C_2^{RF,min} > 0$ to $C_1^{RF,min} - C_2^{RF,max} < 0$. As all functions involved are continuous $C_1 - C_2$ is continuous. Thus, by the intermediate value theorem and monotonicity there exists a unique policy mix (\hat{r}, \hat{k}) with $\hat{r} = \tilde{r}$ that yields the allocation $(\hat{K}_1, \hat{R}_1, \hat{Y}_1, \hat{C}_1, \hat{K}_2, \hat{R}_2, \hat{Y}_2, \hat{C}_2)$ that is both on the RF-utility frontier and ex-post sustainable, i.e. it fulfills $C_1 = C_2$. Therefore, there exists a \hat{k} for which $\hat{C}_1 = F(1, \tilde{r}) - \hat{k} = (1 - D(\tilde{r}))F(\hat{k}, 1 - \tilde{r}) = \hat{C}_2$. As shown in Appendix A.4(i) for $\hat{k} > \tilde{k}$, Condition (11) for ex-post efficiency is not met.

(iii) As shown in Appendix A.4(i) (\tilde{r}, \tilde{k}) does not meet Condition (11) and $\tilde{R}_1 = \tilde{r}$ is irreversible. At time $t = 1b$ k can still be adapted in the range $k \in [0, k^{EP,max} = F(1, \tilde{r})]$.

The social planner sets k so that X is ex-post efficient, i.e. it fulfills Conditions (11) and (12) (Lemma 1(ii)) and is on the RF-utility frontier, i.e. it fulfills (A.39) and (A.40). This leads to the following system:

$$F_R(1, \tilde{r})F_K(k, 1 - \tilde{r}) - D'(\tilde{r})F(k, 1 - \tilde{r})/(1 - D(\tilde{r})) = F_R(k, 1 - \tilde{r}), \quad (\text{A.41})$$

$$C_2 = (1 - D(\tilde{r}))F(k, 1 - \tilde{r}) = \bar{C}. \quad (\text{A.42})$$

There exists a unique value of $\bar{C} \in [0, \bar{C}^{EP,max}]$ so that this system can be solved for (r^*, k^*) . To see this, note that \bar{C} determines k and therefore C_2 in (A.40) and C_1 in (A.39). For ex-post efficiency consider the effect of minimal and maximal capital transfers on (A.41). From (A.41) define a function $\phi(k) = F_R(1, \tilde{r})F_K(k, 1 - \tilde{r}) - D'(\tilde{r})F(k, 1 - \tilde{r})/(1 - D(\tilde{r})) - F_R(k, 1 - \tilde{r})$. Setting $\bar{C} = 0$ implies $k^{EP,min} = 0$. For $\phi(0)$

this yields $\phi(0) = F_R(1, \tilde{r})F_K(0, 1 - \tilde{r}) - D'(\tilde{r})F(0, 1 - \tilde{r})/(1 - D(\tilde{r})) - F_R(0, 1 - \tilde{r}) > 0$. Setting $\bar{C} = \tilde{C}$ implies \tilde{k} from Appendix A.3. As shown in Appendix A.4(i) this yields: $\phi(\tilde{k}) = F_R(1, \tilde{r})F_K(\tilde{k}, 1 - \tilde{r}) - D'(\tilde{r})F(\tilde{k}, 1 - \tilde{r})/(1 - D(\tilde{r})) - F_R(\tilde{k}, 1 - \tilde{r}) < 0$.

As a decreasing k monotonically increases $F_K(k, 1 - \tilde{r})$, monotonically decreases $F(k, \tilde{r})$ and monotonically decreases $F_R(k, 1 - \tilde{r})$, $\phi(k)$ is monotonically decreasing in k . Varying k from 0 to \tilde{k} changes $\phi(k)$ from $\phi(0) > 0$ to $\phi(\tilde{k}) < 0$. As all functions involved are continuous $\phi(k)$ is continuous. Thus, by the intermediate value theorem and monotonicity, there exists a unique value of k and a corresponding value of \bar{C} so that $\phi(k^*) = 0$ and (r^*, k^*) is ex-post efficient, i.e. it fulfills (A.41). Therefore, there exists a unique policy (r^*, k^*) with $r^* = \tilde{r}$ and $k^* < \tilde{k}$ that yields an allocation $X^* = (K_1^*, R_1^*, Y_1^*, C_1^*, K_2^*, R_2^*, Y_2^*, C_2^*)$ that is ex-post efficient.

A.5 Proof of Proposition 3

When the the social planner sets (r, k) at time $t = 1a$ under awareness of the damages $D(R_1)$ the generations' consumption levels at time $t = 1b$ are:

$$C_1 = F(1, r) - k, \quad (\text{A.43})$$

$$C_2 = (1 - D(r))F(k, 1 - r). \quad (\text{A.44})$$

Note, that this analysis holds equally for utility as consumption is the only good in the model. For an ex-post efficient allocation Conditions (11) and (12) must hold (Lemma 1(ii)), and Condition (6) for sustainability (Definition 2). With (A.43) and (A.44) these conditions are:

$$(1 - D(r))F(k, 1 - r) = F(1, r) - k \quad (\text{A.45})$$

$$F_R(1, r)F_K(k, 1 - r) - D'(r)F(k, 1 - r)/(1 - D(r)) = F_R(k, 1 - r), \quad (\text{A.46})$$

$$(1 - D(r))F(k, 1 - r) = \bar{C}. \quad (\text{A.47})$$

There exists a unique value of $\bar{C} \in [0, \bar{C}^{Bliss,max}]$ so that this system can be solved for (r, k) ; with this value of \bar{C} (r, k) is uniquely determined. To see this, note that \bar{C} determines (r, k) . Think of C_1 as a function of C_2 (defined by A.43, A.44, A.46, A.47 through

variation of \bar{C} , where $\bar{C} = C_2$ as shown in Appendix A.1(i)) and consider first the minimal and maximal achievable consumption levels, indicated by $C_t^{Bliss,min}$ and $C_t^{Bliss,max}$, respectively. Setting $\bar{C} = 0$ implies $k^{Bliss,min} = 0$ and $r^{Bliss,min} = 1$, which yields $C_1^{Bliss,max} = F(1, r^{Bliss,min}) > 0$ and $C_2^{Bliss,min} = (1 - D(r^{Bliss,min}))F(0, 1 - r^{Bliss,min}) = 0$. Setting $\bar{C} = \bar{C}^{Bliss,max}$ implies $k^{Bliss,max} = F(1, r^{Bliss,max})$. Inserting $k^{Bliss,max}$ into Equation (A.46) uniquely yields $r^{Bliss,max}$, so that $C_1^{Bliss,min} = F(1, r^{Bliss,max}) - k^{Bliss,max} = 0$ and $C_2^{Bliss,max} = (1 - D(r^{Bliss,max}))F(k^{Bliss,max}, 1 - r^{Bliss,max}) > 0$. By (A.47) we know that $dk/d\bar{C} = 1/(1 - D(r))F_K > 0$ and $dr/d\bar{C} = -1/((1 - D(r))F_R - D'F(k, 1 - r)) < 0$. As F is concave and C_1 is decreased linearly by increasing k as in (1), increasing k and reducing r by the ex-post efficient mix (A.46) via increasing \bar{C} from 0 to $\bar{C}^{Bliss,max}$ decreases C_1 monotonically from $C_1^{Bliss,max}$ to 0. As all functions involved are continuous $C_1(\bar{C})$ is continuous. Increasing \bar{C} simultaneously increases C_2 continuously and monotonically from 0 to $C_2^{Bliss,max}$. Thus, by the intermediate value theorem and monotonicity, there exists a unique value of \bar{C} so that the corresponding (r^{Bliss}, k^{Bliss}) and allocation $X^{Bliss} = (K_1^{Bliss}, R_1^{Bliss}, Y_1^{Bliss}, C_1^{Bliss}, K_2^{Bliss}, R_2^{Bliss}, Y_2^{Bliss}, C_2^{Bliss},)$ ensure $C_1 = C_2$, i.e. fulfill (A.45).

This allocation is reduced feasible, that is feasible under irreversibility and unawareness as: at $t = 1a$ the social planner can choose any $r \in [0, 1]$. From the existence proof its clear that $r^{Bliss} \in [0, 1]$. So, in $t = 1a$ the social planner chooses r^{Bliss} and some matching k . At $t = 1b$ the damage becomes apparent and r^{Bliss} is fixed. Still, k can be adjusted $k \in [0, F(1, r^{Bliss})]$ generating a RF-utility frontier as in the existence proof. Therefore, the policy (r^{Bliss}, k^{Bliss}) which yields an ex-post efficient and ex-post sustainable allocation is reduced feasible, that is feasible under unawareness and irreversibility.