ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT NGOs: A SURVEY OF EXISTING DATASETS

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Abstract
This work is a survey of the existing datasets on development NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) and of the related empirical literature. We define NGOs as non-profit and non-governmental aid intermediaries, public good providers that channel donors’ funds; these can be both international NGOs and local NGOs in recipient countries. We organize the surveyed datasets in four categories following the unit of observation: information at the NGO level on Northern NGOs, accounts of aid flows through different channels (among which NGOs), information at the NGO level on Southern NGOs, information at the project level. This paper aims to be a research tool for scholars willing to engage in the empirical analysis of NGOs in the field of development, and it is an ongoing work that will be updated regularly.

Keywords: Non-Governmental Organizations, Development, Aid, datasets

JEL codes: L31, O19

Introduction.
Non-governmental and non-profit organizations engaged in development activities are object of growing interest of economic research, both from a theoretical (e.g. Fruttero and Gauri, 2005; Aldashev and Verdier, 2010) and an empirical standpoint (see for example examples Werker and Ahmed, 2008; Atkinson et al, 2012; Dreher et al., 2012, and other contributions discussed below).

It is an expanding field for economists, that is developing its own characteristics, departing from different strands of literature, such as non-profit enterprises, charitable giving, aid effectiveness, collective action in service delivery. There is a clear need for a systematization of the existing resources for empirical analysis and this paper aims at giving a contribution in this direction.

Our focus is the empirical side of the literature: what I do here is a survey of the existing datasets on development NGOs (I will provide for a precise definition later on) and of the related empirical literature. This paper aims to be a research tool for scholars willing to engage in the empirical analysis of NGOs in the field of development.

The work that follows is organized along a classification of datasets rather than a review of the literature: empirical papers are presented in order to describe the data they exploit and how these have been used so far.
This paper is an ongoing work and will be updated regularly, following the input coming from readers in case of datasets that are missing in the survey and in case of availability of new ones.

I first present a working definition of our object of interest and a discussion of “what is in” and “what is left out”. I then sketch a classification of the different types of datasets. The core of this paper is a brief description of each of the surveyed datasets to describe its main features, source(s), the main information it includes, which datasets have been constructed starting from raw data and their use in the literature, including a brief overview of the main findings of empirical works\(^1\). I try to focus also on the main methodological problems faced in the empirical analysis on each dataset.

**A working definition of development NGOs.**

There is no unique definition of what a non-governmental organization is. However, the main characteristic is to be actors legally independent from the State, founded by private initiative (non-governmental) and non-profit (defined by the non-distribution constraint on profits); they are often considered to be public good providers. According to some authors they are characterized by open membership (Murdie and Davis, 2012).

The working definition adopted here is of NGOs as non-profit and non-governmental aid intermediaries, that is public good providers that channel donors’ funds.

The very background literature is the one on private provision of public goods, not at the individual contribution level, but rather at the non-profit organization level; we apply this approach to the channelling of donors’ aid to this purpose.

We consider three sets of actors:

- A. Donors
- B. NGOs
- C. Beneficiaries

We consider two possible cases falling in our field of interest: A = Northern donors, B = Northern NGO, C = Southern NGO; or: A = Northern NGO, B = Southern NGOs, C = individual beneficiaries.

Although they are very different actors, we consider both development NGOs in the “North” that work on service provision in the “South” and on fundraising and campaigning in their home country, and on local NGOs in developing countries, that may include very different entities such as grassroots organizations, farmers’ or village organizations, civil society associations, etc. The reason why we consider both of them is that they are both actors in the aid “value chain”, that is they act as intermediaries between donors and beneficiaries of development aid channelled through private actors.

Besides this core, there is a cloud of possible cases and topics that can be either included or excluded by our work. Some established sub-field in economics are left out with the purpose of narrowing our survey. These are: charitable giving, its motivations and the role of tax incentives to shape giving behaviour (see Kolm and Mercier Ythier, 2006, Bekkers and Wiepking, 2007, List, 2011); aid effectiveness in development (Hansen & Tarp, 2000, Bourguignon & Sundberg, 2007, Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2009); non-profit organizations as service providers in the North (Rose-

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\(^1\) When reviewing highly descriptive papers, I will refrain from reporting all results for reasons of length. For a summary of findings, I advice the reader to address directly to the original papers, that will be mentioned in the references.
Ackerman, 1996); microfinance literature, when only concerned on the financial and credit analysis (Morduch, 1999); self-help groups composition and performance, without specific connection to donor’ funding and support (La Ferrara, 2004); literature on volunteering and motivated labour in the North (Prendergast, 1999, Besley & Ghatak, 2003, Gibbons & Roberts, 2012).

On the contrary, we include in our survey cases where money is channelled through NGOs, but it is provided by Southern government instead of Northern donors (leaving out decentralization related issues); microfinance institutions if they channel aid funds; composition of local NGOs and determinants of membership if this is linked to donor sponsorship.

Existing datasets: types of data.

We organize the surveyed datasets in categories following the unit of observation used. The categories that we have identified so far are the following:

1. information at the NGO level, on international (Northern) NGOs: flow of aid from NGO i to country j (usually matched with recipient country information)
2. accounts of aid flows through different channels, among which NGOs: flow of aid through channel i to country j (usually matched with recipient country information)
3. information at the NGO level on local (Southern) NGOs: characteristics of NGO, information on the relationship with donors, international NGO and other external sponsorship
4. information at the project level: characteristics of the project, amount, sources and means of funding.

In each subsection, I will first go through the datasets including NGOs based in a single country, and then through datasets that collect information on NGOs based in various countries.

The datasets: information at the NGO level on international (Northern) NGOs.

Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.

The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (DDC) provides data at the NGO level on what concerns Swiss NGOs; listed NGOs are 408. The most relevant information is their source of funding: "aid proper", contributions and official financing. “Aid proper” means NGO self-financing (projects falling in that category are funded mainly by private donations). “Contributions” refers to officially-cofinanced projects, while the third aid channel involves NGOs only as implementing agencies for official agencies projects. The last isn’t disaggregated by country and cannot be used for country-specific analysis. These data are based on annual surveys conducted by DCC between 2002 and 2005 through questionnaires sent to about 500 NGOs (among which 408 took part in the survey).

Starting from these data, some scholars (Dreher et al., 2012) constructed a dataset adding information on recipient countries: the outcome is a matched dataset, where each observation corresponds to a couple “NGO i and country j”. Observations in principle include 408 NGOs that intervene in 126 countries. Authors nevertheless restrict their sample to 307 NGOs, thus excluding the smallest quartile. And they drop the time dimension: variables are taken at their mean average between 2002 and 2005, in order to smooth otherwise volatile aid.
Newly added information include: log GDP per capita of receiving country (as an indicator of need), log population (since the dependent variable is not in per capita terms), “control of corruption” (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007 index), severity of a natural disaster in case it occurred, measured by the log of affected population (the source is EM-DAT from OFDA/CRED International Disaster database), a dummy for “fragile” State (cfr. Collier and Hoefler, 2004), and the amount of ODA (Official Development Assistance) received by each country.

The analysis done on these data is the following: authors first of all regress the amount of aid going from NGO i to country j (sum of self-financing and contributions) on the share of NGO budget represented by public contributions. This explanatory variable is interacted with other controls in order to see which is the importance of each of these factors at different levels of financial dependence of the NGO. A second analysis is performed on the subsample (40 observations) of NGOs that actually received contributions: here “aid proper” and amount of contributions are alternatively used as dependent variables.

Authors investigate whether NGO aid tracks ODA and how differently financed NGOs allocate their funds. The main result is that there is overall little difference between NGO aid and ODA: NGO aid is generally in line with ODA, and this is mainly true for NGOs receiving contributions; at the same time financial dependence does not impair NGO poverty orientation. NGO tend also to locate where other NGOs are active.

From the methodological point of view, the main problems authors face are two. First, the possible overspecification deriving from the fact that ODA flow may be explained by the same variables that are supposed to explain NGO flows: authors account for this by using as explanatory variable the residual ODA after regression on the same controls.

The second problem, that is quite frequent in such studies, is that many of the observations are zeros: the reason is that –quite obviously- NGOs don’t intervene in every country, so that the majority of NGO-country matches correspond to a null amount of money. In this case, the problem is faced by using a Tobit model (Cfr. Barthlémy and Tichit, 2004, Nunnenkamp and Ohler, 2011, discussed later on). This choice implies that authors imagine that eligibility of a country and the amount to be disbursed occur simultaneously and are affected by the same factors.

To deal with the same problem, another option would be a two step estimation with a Probit in the first stage: this means to imagine that NGO i first chooses whether to intervene or not in country j and, then, decides the amount of money to be delivered. Here another choice has to be made, whether to take into account in the second step the information of the first (thus assuming that error terms in the two equations are correlated), or not. Of course, the first (Heckman selection model; see, Koch et al. 2009, discussed later on) is preferable, but it implies the need to find an exclusion restriction, a variable that affects the selection of a country, but not the amount allocated, that may be difficult. An alternative model has been suggested by Neumayer (2002), that is to perform a simple OLS after Probit: this means ignoring the selection bias, that can be small if the number of zeros in the sample is limited.

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2 For a detailed note on how is a disaster is defined, see http://www.emdat.be/criteria-and-definition (database background material by the CRED, Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, UCL, Belgium).

3 Aid flows that qualify as ODA must comply to some requirement set by OCDE: it has to be directed to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions, and it has to be “provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agency” and “administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective” and concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent) “ (OECD, 2008)
United States Agency for International Development (USAID): registry of US NGOs engaged in international development cooperation.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) keeps a registry of US based Private Voluntary Organizations. Organizations that are eligible to register are defined as follows: “non-governmental, not-for-profit entity that is tax exempt, solicits and receives cash contributions from the general public and is engaged in, or intends to become engaged in, development and humanitarian activities.” (http://idea.usaid.gov/ls/pvo/faq#q1) These organizations are the object of yearly VolAg Reports by USAID. The 2012 Report includes information on 579 US PVOs, 95 international PVOs and 6 US Cooperative Development Organizations.

The registry exists since 1946, but it is kept by USAID since 1966 and before that date by the agency’s predecessors.

This database (http://idea.usaid.gov/ls/pvo) includes information on major revenue items of NGOs: official funds, private donations, commercial revenues; it includes also expenditures and, namely, distinguishes between expenses for administration, management and fundraising, and “core” expenditures, that is the “charitable output” itself. Moreover, USAID provides information on aid sectors and recipient countries (although without the amounts per sector). The name and link to NGO websites are provided.

These data are used by Peter Nunnenkamp and Hannes Öhler (2012a), who construct a cross-section database on 588 NGOs, matching the aforementioned information with data collected through NGO websites (data refer to 2007): they add to the original dataset whether the NGO allows for different options to designate private donations for specific activities, both sectors and geographical areas, whether periodical donations are possible and whether it is possible to donate on-line.

Authors join to these data the information taken from the EM-DAT (OFDA/CRED International Disaster) on the severity of natural disasters in recipient countries (number of people affected), as a possible factor driving donations. Among explanatory variables, a variable indicating the number of people affected by disasters is thus added.

The aim of their paper is to analyze the driving forces of donations to NGOs, thus the dependent variable is the log of private donations. The explanatory variables are, first of all, expenses for fundraising and the “efficiency price” of NGO aid, that is defined as the inverse of the share of service expenditures (total expenditures less fundraising and administrative expenses) on total expenditure. This last measure aims to capture the relative magnitude of costs different from output delivery. Other regressors are: years since registration, amount of public funding and of private revenues, expenses for foreign programmes as a share of total expenses, number of countries and sectors in which the NGO is active.

Overlapping between NGOs is measured by fundraising expenditures of other NGOs that intervene in countries (or sectors) that overlap with those of NGO i. NGO density (number of NGOs in the same US State as NGO i) and a dummy variable indicating if NGO i has offices and/or sister organisation in other developed countries. NGO characteristics on what concerns donation procedures are captured by dummy variables that indicate if the NGO offers the possibility to private donors to designate their donations (and if the designation can be for a specific sector, a

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4 I consider these as synonymous of NGOs, even if USAID makes a distinction: their definition, nevertheless, corresponds to our definition of NGO.
5 An alternative definition considers only administrative expenses.
6 In the case of overlapping by countries, the fundraising is weighted by population.
specific country or according to other parameters), a dummy variable equal to 1 if online donations are possible and another that is equal to 1 if periodic donations are allowed.

The model used is an OLS estimation; the main result is that private donations are not affected as expected by NGO characteristics, and are rather affected by the possibility to designate donations.

The same dataset is used by the same authors (Nunnenkamp and Öhler, 2012b), in order to investigate the determinants of the “efficiency” of NGOs. Proxies for inefficiency are two: administrative and management costs and expenses for fundraising. In these dataset, the authors add some variables concerning the recipient country: GDP per capita, control of corruption (World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, WGI), average distance to the recipient country capital, average per capita income in the metropolitan area in which the headquarter of the NGO is located. Dummies indicating sectors and taking the value of 1 if NGO is working in that sector is added.

The same source of data has been used by McCleary and Barro (2007), but in a time-series perspective. The authors collected data from 1939 to 2004 from the USAID dataset and predecessor government agencies: the President’s Committee on War Relief Agencies (1939-42), the War Relief Control Board (1942-46), the Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (1946-51) and the Foreign Operations Administration/International Cooperation Administration (1953-61). The missing years are 1975-77, 1979 and 1982.

Information is available for 1638 NGOs that registered with the US federal government sometimes between 1939 and 2004 and are US-based, in the sense that they received the tax-exempt charitable status in the US. To enter the sample, an NGO has to register with the relevant agency: one of the required features to register is to perform mainly international activities. Nevertheless, the information on expenditures allows the authors to measure the share of the international and of the domestic program expenditure.

The data allow to create three broad categories on what concerns the source of funding: federal, international organizations and other governments, private. Moreover, authors created a classification scheme for the type of the NGO, both at the founding and in the last year of observation: 14 religious categories, secular, and unclassified, using information from NGO annual reports, InterAction documents and publications from umbrella organizations and “watch-dog” groups.

Authors analyze the numerical trends of the different groups, the transitions (61 cases) from one type to another and the determinants of changes in size of NGOs.

*Charities Aid Foundation, UK*

This dataset is constructed through annual surveys on major UK charities since 1978; these data are collected by Charities Aid Foundation in the report “Charity Trends” (https://www.cafonline.org/publications/2011-publications/charity-trends.aspx and data available online at http://www.charitytrends.org/). All registered charities in England and Wales are part of the dataset (currently 160000). The survey is conducted by the Charity Commission of England and Wales that requires charities to send an Annual Return.

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7 From the US Internal Revenue Service.
8 InterAction (http://www.interaction.org/) is a network of humanitarian and development US-based NGOs.
9 From 2001 it’s CaritasData that provides data to CAF.
11 Website accessed 17th April 2013.
Information required depends on the total income of the charity:

1) Charities whose income is less than 500,000 £ only have to provide basic information: a summary income and expenditure amount, details of the financial year start and finish, contact details, trustee details, area of operation, activities, beneficiaries, ways and tools by which the charity operates.

2) Charities whose income is between 500,001 £ and 1,000,000 £ have to provide the above information plus detailed financial information (that will be described below)

3) Charities whose income is greater than 1,000,001 £ have to provide the above information plus the “summary information return”, that is a summary of charity’s key aims, activities and achievements.

Information is divided in 4 categories: location (where does the charity operates), the charity mission, resources and funding data, and the number of employees/volunteers. This last information since 2009 is requested to all charities and not only to the big ones.

Information on income and resources include: total gross declared income, expenditures, assets and liabilities, incoming resources, and balance sheets.

On what concerns charities whose income is greater than 500,000 £, the dataset provides the breakdown of NGO funds that are derived from self-financing: the detail of what is defined as “voluntary income” is thus provided, that includes donations, legacies, value of good donated to charity shops, revenue from fund-raising events and national lottery fund grants.

The structure of the data allows for a panel analysis. There is some risk of double counting, since some NGOs act as intermediaries of funding for others NGOs.

This dataset is used by Atkinson et al (2012): they select major NGOs, that is those NGOs who also report on the detail of their income composition. They construct a panel dataset covering years from 1978 to 2006 and divide the sample in two groups, since their analysis is mainly concerned by the comparison between these two: on one hand, development charities (70 cases), that include “religious international” organizations and emergency relief, and, on the other hand, other non-development charities (726 cases).

The authors analyze the growth of donations to development charities and its patterns: their main interest is in studying the growth of donations to development NGOs compared to non development NGOs and their respective market share. They find out that the average growth of donations to development NGOs is 7,4%, with a big surge in 1985, that corresponds with the big famine in Ethiopia. This big growth in donations is not specific to development NGOs, since the amount of donations increased for other charities in a similar way. Another question is the responsiveness of giving to household income: they find an income elasticity non significantly different from 1, that means that donations increase proportionally with income.

Authors moreover devote attention to the evolution of concentration of donations and of charities market share: although the degree of concentration declined in the analyzed span of time, it remains high by the industrial standards.

Dataset on “big NGOs” constructed by Dirk-Jan Koch, Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele (2009).
These authors constructed an original dataset matching data on 61 NGOs and 114 recipient countries. Most data refer to 2005.

The NGO sample have been selected on the basis of 2 criteria: their annual aid budget exceeds 10 mln euro in 2005 and they are non mainly humanitarian organizations. The humanitarian NGOs are excluded since their aid allocation is supposed to be driven mainly by external shocks. Contacted NGOs were 98 and 61 responded to the request\textsuperscript{12}. The choice of focussing on big NGOs implies that many small NGOs are not covered, even if they may be grouped in federations and umbrellas. Nevertheless, the overall budget of the NGOs included in the sample amounts to 35% of the grants by all NGOs reported by OECD in 2005. It has to be noted that the sample includes five big foundations that are not included in the OECD statistics: a specific feature of these is that they do not receive public funding.

Selected countries are those on the OECD DAC list in 2005 and that are not small island states (since these are outliers in per capita aid flows and have many missing values).

This result in a dataset where observations are in principle 61 x 114 = 6954; dependent variable missing values will reduce observations to 5409.

The main information available is first of all the amount of aid going from NGO i to country j. Then, a set of information relative to each country is added, that can be grouped in 5 categories: poverty measures, good governance, preference of backdonors, effect of the presence of other NGOs, key characteristics that countries may share with donors.

Poverty measures are GDP per capita (2004, at constant 2000 dollars; source: World Bank, 2006), HDI (2004; source: Human Development Report) and Gini coefficient (in order to capture relative poverty; source: UNDP, 2006), “Good governance” is proxied by Polity IV index (-10 to 10 range; source: Marshall and Jaggers, 2004), Freedom House indicators of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (2-14 range; source: Freedom House, 2006) the World Bank Rule of Law index (range: -2,04 to 2,36; 2004; source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005), the Rule of Law index provided by the International Country Risk Guide (range 1 to 12; 2004), and the corruption perception index (range: 0 to 10; source: Transparency International: \url{http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi}). The preference of backdonors is proxied by log bilateral aid that a country received in 2004 from the home country in which the NGO is based as reported by the OECD/DAC. To check whether donor interests shape the choices of NGOs the share of the recipient country in total exports of the donor country is included. A variable indicating the political interest of donor country is conformity of voting in the United Nations General Assembly of the recipient country with the home country of the NGO. The presence of other NGOs is measured by the number of NGOs from the same sample that are present in the same country and the overall amount of aid delivered by all NGOs to that country. The fact that the recipient country shares the same characteristics as the NGO home country is captured by two dummies: the first takes the value of one if both countries “have Christian foundations”, and the second takes value of one if the recipient country was a former colony of the donor one. Log population size of recipient country is included.

Authors regress the log amount of aid (not in per capita terms) on the set of explanatory variables. The chosen method is a Heckman selection model. Performing first a Probit and then OLS is used as a comparison, as is a Tobit model (see before for a comparison between the different methods). Authors use joint religion as exclusion restriction, since they argue that the decision to select a

\textsuperscript{12} Some big NGOs who did not respond are the US Catholic Relief Services the Gates Foundation, Save the Children and Oxfam in the United Kingdom, and several national offices of World Vision International.
recipient country on the basis of such characteristics is likely to have occurred decades ago and is unlikely to shape current decisions on amounts allocated\textsuperscript{13}.

Main results is that NGOs follow needs of recipient countries when deciding the amount to be allocated, and that they are not systematically influenced by commercial interests of backdonors. On the other hand, there is no evidence that NGOs allocate funds to more institutionally difficult environments; they moreover, tend to locate where ODA from their home country is located and where other NGOs operate.

\textit{International Cooperation Academy on Civil Society (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Radboud University of Nijmegen)}

These institutions collected data on 22 among major international NGOs, asking them to self report data on the fiscal year 2004. Data include total expenditures of the NGOs, both covered through private and through public funding. Selected NGOs are based in Netherlands, Germany, Norway and US.

Koch (2007) constructs a dataset where all countries that are in the 2005 DAC list are included, since aid flows that these countries receive is qualified as ODA. For each country, we know the aid flow from each of the selected NGO, its population, GDP per capita, whether it is classified as “non priority”, “high priority” or “top priority” in UNDP Development Report\textsuperscript{14} (2003), and the flow of both ODA and official aid\textsuperscript{15} in 2004, based on OECD/DAC statistics (see below for a detail of OECD data). The author adds an indicator of “good governance”, using the factor score of the six Kauffman indicators (in 2004; World Bank indicators), that include voice and accountability, government effectiveness, control of corruption, regulatory quality, rule of law and political stability.

The author uses these data in order to measure concentration and dispersion of NGO aid across countries. He constructs Lorenz curves in order to look at aid concentration, by plotting the cumulative share of NGO aid on the cumulative share of population in recipient countries: he finds indeed evidence of concentration, since 80\% of people leaving in the lowest share of recipient countries, receive 20\% of aid. He then compares the allocation of aid through NGO and through public channels with respect to the quality of governance in the recipient countries, and finds little difference, thus concluding that NGO aid and public bilateral aid are rather complements than substitutes.

\textit{Yearbook of International Organizations}

The Union of International Associations (http://www.uia.be/) produces a list of active international non-governmental organizations and intergovernmental organizations. Organizations included are both formally structured associations and informal networks, excluding for-profit enterprises. The list of international NGOs is constructed asking information to already known NGOs, looking at lists produced by donor foundations and international organizations, and by original research in newspapers and reports. The UIA then collects information to NGOs asking them to self report data

\textsuperscript{13} Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Authors exclude reverse causality problems, since explanatory variables are not likely to be influenced in the short term; explanatory variables are nonetheless lagged of one year. Robustness checks are performed excluding foundations, Christian NGOs and smallest/biggest.

\textsuperscript{14} Depending on the level of human poverty and progress towards MDGs

\textsuperscript{15} For a definition of ODA, see footnote 1.
on their activities, structure, staff, etc. This allows the UIA –since 1910- to keep a Yearbook of International Organizations (http://www.uia.be/yearbook).

The following information is available: first of all the name and acronym of the association, its address(es) and web page(s). On what concerns the history of the association, information is collected on when and where the association was founded and the names of founding bodies. The association’s principal objectives, usually based on the statutes, are recorded; on a keyword-based search the association’s field of interest is coded. On the structure side we know the key organs and commissions, together with some indication of the frequency of their meetings and the composition of the executive body. Other information are: the languages used by the association, the number of paid and voluntary staff, the date and location of periodic meetings or other events (exhibitions, seminars, etc.), both past and future, and the publications and information services. On the side of NGO’s finances, data include sources of funding and sponsoring bodies, as a a summary of the main activities and programme concerns. On what concerns membership, the available data are number of members, type of membership and a list of countries represented. The relationships with other NGOs and with intergovernmental organizations are reported; following this, the UIA has then developed a ranking to indicate the degree of “internationality” of the NGO.

The UIA has also developed another tool for UNESCO that is a database of NGOs having relationships with it (http://ngo-db.unesco.org/).

Murdie and Davis (2012) use the data in the UIA data to conduct a network analysis on international NGOs: they use the 2001-2002 edition of the Yearbook and construct a matrix of 4378 x 4378 NGOs, in order to study the relationships among them. The selected NGOs belong to the following issue areas: human rights (663), sustainable development (158), environment (1019), health (1695), or some combination of these fields (843).

Main findings are that international NGOs network seem to be quite sparse and not to display “small world” characteristics,16 that NGOs tend to tie more often with organizations working on similar issues, and that network patterns display very different characteristics according to the different issue areas. Moreover, capacity represents a major constraint to the possibility to enter into networks and that this heavily impacts organizations on the Global South. The role of intergovernmental organizations to trigger NGO networking seems important.

The datasets: accounts of aid flows through different channels, among which NGOs

Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.

Nunnenkamp, Weingarth and Weisser (2009) exploit part of the same dataset provided by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation already described above. Here, the unit of observation is not the individual NGO, but the aid channel directing funds to different countries. Indeed, observations are 126, that are the recipient countries: for each of them, information is given on a vector of characteristics and on aid received through 6 aid channels. Public aid is disentangled between development aid proper and humanitarian aid, besides the contributions to NGOs. The first is furthermore disaggregated between Agency for Development and Cooperation’s funding and SECO aid (that is the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs). We end up with five categories: NGO self-financing, ODA provided by the Development Agency, ODA provided by SECO, humanitarian aid, contributions to NGOs (plus the category of “public aid” that includes the last four mentioned).

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16 A “small world” network is a network where most of the nodes can be reached by any other through a small number of steps.
Country level data are partly the same as the ones described for the first dataset (see above, page 3): log GDP per capita, log population, control of corruption index, severity of natural disasters, and a dummy of “fragile states”. Indicators of backdonors interests are added: bilateral exports of Switzerland to each recipient country (in order to measure trade-related interests) and the voting behaviour of recipient country in UN assemblies (whether they vote as Switzerland).

Authors, in the base specification, investigate the effect of the listed explanatory variables on each aid category. Their main interest is to look at the possible differences between NGO aid proper and ODA allocation: overall they find few differences, concentrated in the relationship to economic and political interest of donor country.

The model used in the analysis is a Tobit, justified with the same arguments than in the paper by Dreher et al (2012). A possible methodological criticism can be a reverse causality problem, but authors argue that they can rule it out, considering that the effect of aid flows on long term indicators (like GDP per capita or institutional indicators) is unlikely to be strong.

Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency.

SIDA, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, provides data of both ODA and contributions to NGOs: the latter includes information about projects run by Swedish NGO with support from SIDA. The NGO funding is composed by a 10% own contribution and a 90% support from SIDA; this support is given to 15 SIDA organisations, who provide the database with information 4 times per year. This is not exhaustive of the whole amount of Swedish NGO aid, since it doesn’t include resources autonomously raised by NGOs, other channels of public funding of NGOs , and multilateral and regional aid. It is neither exhaustive of the ODA channel, since it doesn’t take into account aid delivered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Export Credits Guarantee Board. In 2005, aid granted by SIDA corresponded to 55% of Sweden total budget for Development Cooperation.

Starting from these data, Axel Dreher and co-authors (2010) construct a dataset, that merges the information on both aid channels. Their dependent variables are aid flows through the different aid channels: on one hand, SIDA aid channelled as ODA and, on the other hand ,bilateral aid that is administered by NGOs but publicly co-financed by SIDA itself, both disaggregated by country and sector. Dependent variables are defined as log aid each country receives as a percentage of total aid allocated by SIDA, and as a percentage of NGO aid respectively; we have both the overall information and the information for each sector activity. The sector disaggregation includes the following: health (including HIV); education; infrastructure together with private sector, urban development and financial system; democracy, governance and human rights; natural resources and environment.

These data refer to the 2002-2006 period. Recipient countries are 110.

Information on possible determinants of aid flows is available at the recipient country level. First of all, GDP per capita in PPP at constant 2000 dollars (source: World Bank; average 1997-2001) is included, in order to get a measure of “need” in the recipient country. The assessment of the level of deprivation is completed by adding the poverty headcount ratio on the total population (source: World Bank; average 1997-2001) and the log number of people affected by natural disasters (source: http://www.em-dat.net/, average 1997-2001). Another set of explanatory variables relates to the institutional environment in the recipient country: Polity IV (source:

17 As in the other papers that use log values, before taking the log, 1 is added to all values in order not to lose information.
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/ (average 1997-2001\textsuperscript{18}) and a dummy for “fragile States”, based on the World Bank’s Country and Institutional Assessment (CPIA; http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/CPIA). In order to measure economic interest of the donor country, the share of bilateral exports to each recipient country on total Swedish exports is included (source: IMF; average 1997-2001), and the resource endowment of receiving country (resource rents and energy and minerals extracted as a share of GNI. Source: World Bank. Average 1997-2001). A measure of Swedish political interest is the number of times each country voted the same as Sweden in the UN General Assembly over the total number of votes every year (average 1997-2001). Population is also included since the dependent variables is not in per capita terms (source: World Bank, 2006, all residents count), and the external debt/GNI ratio (WB data, 2004) too.

The model used is again a model that fits the bounded nature of dependent variables, that display many zero values: the same set of variables is assumed to affect both whether a country is selected and the amount it receives, thus using a Tobit model (instead of a Heckman model with and exclusion restriction). As a robustness check, authors perform a Probit model where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether or not each country received aid from ODA or NGO channel during the same time span (2002-2006).

Main results are that NGOs differ with respect to ODA on what concerns the relation between flow of aid and political interest, but no difference is found with respect of the institutional environment of recipient countries; interestingly, NGO aid doesn’t decrease in per capita GDP of the recipient country, while ODA does\textsuperscript{19}.

\textit{German Ministry of Economic cooperation and Development and Statistiches Bundesamt (Germany).}

Nunnenkamp and Ohler (2011) merge two sets of German data on aid channels. This has the peculiarity of joining information on official aid channels with survey information on NGO own resources.

The first is provided by the German Ministry of Economic cooperation and Development (BMZ) and offers an account of bilateral ODA across recipient countries, separating between emergency aid, financial cooperation and technical cooperation. Financial cooperation is specified both as overall net flows, thus including both loans and grants, and as grants alone (thus excluding loans, that may take negative values). Technical cooperation includes programs implemented by the public agency devoted to it, GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit), but also technical cooperation for human resource development (implemented by other agencies) and private sector refinancing: the latter is divided into refinancing to clerical organizations, to political organizations and to other NGOs. Also aid delivered by other institutions is recorded, such as other Ministries, Landers and Federal Asset Fund that manages debt relief.

The second source of data provides information on allocation of German NGOs’ own resources raised through donations, sales and membership fees. The differentiation between clerical and other NGOs cannot be done. These data are raised through a survey carried out in 2007 to about 500 organizations. Authors argue that bias due to non response should not affect much the use of the data, since the missing NGOs are plausibly mainly oriented to domestic activities.

\textsuperscript{18} It is a measure of general openness of political institutions, it takes values from 0 to 10.

\textsuperscript{19} A relation of NGO aid with poverty is nevertheless found when using poverty headcount measures.
Data are available between 2005 and 2007: this is too few to have a panel; data are used as averages on the three years. Observations are the 152 potential recipient countries, although some observations may be missing in the explanatory variables set.

Explanatory variables are the usual ones: measures of need, measures of good governance and “quality” of institutions, donor’s self-interest, incidence of disasters, other aid flows, population (since the dependent variable is in absolute and not per capita terms). Recipient’s need is measures by log GDP per capita, infant mortality rate and Human Development Index. Good governance is captured by different indexes: the “voice and accountability” measures by Kauffman et al, 2005, a combined average rating of political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House), the rule of law index (Kauffman et al, 2005), and the “failed state index” (Fund for Peace: http://ffp.statesindex.org/). Donor’s interests are proxied by the share of the recipient country in German exports to all sample countries, and the coincidence of voting in UN Assembly. The magnitude of other aid flows is measured by the aid funds disbursed by the other DAC countries; is is measured by the overall technical cooperation only in the model where the dependent variable is NGO aid proper.

A Tobit model is performed for each separate aid channel on a set of possible determinants at the country level. Aid channels are 13: total ODA, financial cooperation grants, total technical cooperation, GTZ technical cooperation, human resource development, the three refinancing of private sector organizations, other technical cooperation, emergency aid, other ministries funds, Landers’ cooperation, debt relief, NGO own resources.

Main results are that NGOs allocate own resources according to recipient needs, but this is weaker than in the case where NGOs are simply channelling public agency (BMZ) funds for BMZ. The channels that more strongly follow a need-based allocation of funds are also the channels that target more democratic and less corrupt countries.

Data of the European Commission on International NGOs that have projects co-financed by EU.

The European Commission provides data on co-financing of NGO projects in development aid (the budget line is B6-7000): data provided are both commitments and disbursements of European Commission to co-financing European NGO projects in a given country in a given year.

These data are exploited by Nancy and Yoncheva (2006): they construct a panel dataset covering the 1990-1999 period. Each observation corresponds to recipient country i in year t. The dependent variable is the flow of European Commission aid channelled through NGOs: authors focus on development aid, excluding humanitarian, and on commitment instead of disbursements in order to avoid volatility. The aid variable is in absolute and not per capita terms (cfr. Feeny and McGlivray, 2001). Flows are converted into constant US dollars.

Explanatory variables are, as usual, indicators of need, donor’s interests and good governance. For the first category, they use the share of the population living under the national poverty line and the life expectancy at birth in years (source for both: World Bank, World Development Indicators). For the second, they use the ratio of the recipient’s imports from the EU to total imports. For the third authors use the Polity IV score developed by the Canadian Department of foreign Affairs and International Trade (on a 1 to 9 scale, from democratic to autocratic), and a measure of “militarization” (the ratio of military personnel over total labour force, provided in World Development indicators). Another variable that is added among possible determinants of NGO aid is EU ODA to country i. Total population and regional dummies are added.
Model used are random effect model and GMM. Main results are that NGO aid appears as driven by poverty, once controlled for population, while it doesn’t seem to be affected by ODA allocation and by EU strategic interests. Militarization has a positive coefficient in the Middle East, but it changes sign when interacted with the political variable (NGOs tend avoid working in countries that are highly autocratic and militarized at the same time).

OECD DAC (Development Assistance Committee) Statistics database

OECD provides aid statistics (http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/international-development-statistics.htm) in two databases: the DAC (Development Assistance Committee) Statistics and the Creditor Reporting System. I present the former here and the latter in the final section of this paper. The data (accessible at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE1) are collected yearly since 1960 both from DAC members countries and from other donors. The list of donors that are DAC members is available at the following link: http://www.oecd.org/investment/stats/31738599.pdf.

The dataset keeps track of aid and resource flows that include Official Development Assistance, other official flows (OOF) and private funding (FDI, bank flows and non bank flows). Available variables are: the donor State\(^{20}\), and we know whether it is a DAC member or not; fund flows (grant or loan, commitment or disbursement, gross flow or net flow); amount type (current or constant prices); the aid type, that is one among the following: ODA, other official flows, private flows, private grants.

ODA is defined as reported in footnote above and can be both bilateral and multilateral; the dataset provides the breakdown of ODA in its components. Bilateral ODA includes budget support, bilateral core contributions and pooled programs and funds, project-type interventions, experts and other technical assistance, scholarships and students’ costs in donor country, debt relief, development awareness, actions for refugees in donor countries, administrative costs. OOF include export and investment-related flows and debt rescheduling, other acquisition of equity and offsetting entry of debt relief. Private flows include FDI, other securities and claims, bank and non-bank transactions.

For the ODA component, recipient countries and sector of intervention are available.

The datasets: information at the NGO level on local (Southern) NGOs.


The institution mentioned in the title jointly organized the collection of survey data on Ugandan NGOs in 2002, in order to assess their role and to understand their strength and weaknesses.

Information have been collected on 300 NGOs selected through the following sampling procedure: 14 rural districts have been selected randomly (plus the urban Kampala district). A random sample of NGOs has then been selected (100 from the Kampala district and 200 from the rural districts): sampling on NGOs is based on the register of the NGO Registration Board in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but registers for the selected districts had to be updated and verified before the sampling.

\(^{20}\) The European Union as a whole is also included.
A questionnaire has been administrated in face-to-face interviews with a representative (usually the head) of the NGO. The main problem regarding this dataset is the need to take many answers cautiously: it seems often that answers represent more the ideal of “good NGO conduct” than their reality. It is nevertheless possible to crosscheck within the questionnaire and to find inconsistencies. Barr, Fafchamps and Owens, who were involved in the survey and exploited the data, state that “NGO umbrella organizations in Uganda have impressed upon their members the importance of good governance, transparency, and popular participation. It is therefore possible that, with respect to these issues, respondents told us what they thought we wanted to hear, rather than what they were actually doing.” (Barr et al, 2005: 662)

The same authors provide a clear overview of the information available, that they divide in two areas: characteristics of the NGOs and information about governance. On what concerns characteristics, NGOs are asked to provide information about their activities: they are asked explicitly if they are involved in some main actions, such as raising public awareness, advocacy/lobbying, financial services; they are then asked to list other most important activities. Another information available is the geographical coverage of their action. Then, an account of revenues is provided: NGOs that provide such information are 199. In these cases revenues are cross-checked with expenditures data (and inconsistencies are found in 137 cases over 199). Revenues are divided between grants (with information on the identity of the donor), member fees and fundraising, business income, other recurrent revenues, non recurrent revenues. Expenditures are detailed as follows: program costs and payment to beneficiaries, manpower costs, payments to others, investments and assets. Productive resources are also analyzed, including labour, land, equipment, and managerial skills. The latter is linked to the leadership issue: characteristics about the leader are asked, such as education and familiar background.

On the governance side, the participation in demand for grants is analyzed: whether the NGO received a grant, whether they applied unsuccessfully, how did they hear about the application, how were they selected. Attention is devoted to monitoring activities the NGO are subjected to: direct monitoring by the granting body, by the government and local administration, by the NGO network and umbrella organization, by members themselves, and by beneficiaries (including whether participatory methods are used). A section is devoted to regulation by the government: registration, partnership with Ministries, taxation.

**PSAOP (Senegal) and PNDSA II (Burkina Faso) program database.**

Within these two projects, started at the end of the ‘90s to promote village organizations’ capacity building, both qualitative case studies and quantitative surveys has been collected. The survey has been conducted in 2002 (cross-section data) both in Senegal\(^2\) and in Burkina Faso, and consisted of three questionnaires: a village survey, that included basic characteristics of the village and a census of all village organizations (VOs), an exhaustive survey on the cited VOs, and a household survey containing basic information of all households of the concerned villages. The sampling procedure is the following: the geographical regions included in Senegal are the Peanut Basin, the Senegal River Vally and the Niayes; in Burkina Faso involved regions are the cotton region, the Central Mossi Plateau, and the Oudalan region. Regional selection aims to include ecologically and economically differentiated zones. Within these regions, four to seven

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\(^2\) In collaboration with ASPRODEB (Association Sénégalais pour la Promotion des Petits Projets de Développement à la Base).

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administrative clusters are selected randomly (Communautés Rurales in Senegal, Départements in Burkina) and 14 villages for each cluster are randomly chosen. The size of the sample is summarized in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Burkina Faso</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of villages</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of village</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of households</td>
<td>8114</td>
<td>11998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Village organizations are defined as being “composed of members seeking to improve their livelihoods through collective action” (Bernard et al., 2008: 2188): they have a major function in mediating the relationship between villagers and economic and political actors outside the community rather than the within-community relations. Their main roles are to provide services to members, local public goods, and voice in political affairs. They have legal status and formal membership.

In the sample are included all VOIs that were born since the beginning of the ‘80s, including those who disappeared before 2002; State-led cooperatives that then disappeared with the withdrawal of the State in the mid-80s are not included.

At the village level, information is collected on basic village characteristics, available infrastructures and their distance from the village itself, on the degree of connection with other villages (measured by the comparison of prices of basic food commodities) and on the ethnic, caste and religious composition. A stylized map of the village is constructed, where the infrastructures and the concessions (compounds, living units) are localized.

A full census of existing VOIs is provided, and also an account of projects run through external partnerships.

A second survey is carried on all the VO cited in the village survey. Village organizations are a relevant phenomenon: 65% of Senegalese villages and 91% of Burkinabe villages have at least one. Retrospective data allow to retrace their evolution since the beginning of the ‘80s.

Data are collected on each VO’s creation and history, its rules and governance, composition, roles and responsibilities, external partnerships and relationships with the local institutions, infrastructures and equipment, and on their strategies to get proper funds. A set of questions on possible situations and how the organization would face them, is also designed. A module on the organization’s activities is in place, as are specific modules for each activity.

The household survey includes basic information on all households living in the sample villages: socio-demographic characteristics of the head, some characteristics of other members, variables

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22 Specifically detailed on water facilities.
23 These are, in Burkina: collective field, cotton related activities, trade and horticulture; in Senegal: collective field, management of irrigation perimeters, fishing activities, herding, trade and horticulture.
indicating the social position of the household\textsuperscript{24} (whether it belongs to the traditional élite), assets owned, productive activities, membership to associations and benefits that the household got from it.

To these information, Bernard et al. (2008) add information on rainfall variability (standard deviation of the average yearly rainfall for the past 10 years) at the Communauté Rurale/Département level.

These authors propose a classification between “community-oriented organizations” (CO, provide local public goods or club goods) and “market-oriented organizations” (MO, provide income generating activities for their members) and distinguish their analysis along these two types. Their main analytical points are the following: the correlates of the presence of a MO(CO) in the village; the correlates of the MO(CO) performance, measured by the share of the VO members that declared to have benefited of their participation into the organization; the correlates of a measure of local élite capture, that is a dummy variable indicating whether poor are represented in the MO(CO) at least in the same proportion they are in the whole village\textsuperscript{25}.

Another paper that uses the same data is the one by Arcand and Fafchamps (2012): their aim is to study the composition of village organizations (called CBO in the paper). They a two steps analysis: a first steps consists of an analysis of the characteristics associated with a higher likelihood of belonging to an organization. This is done through a logistic model. The second part of their analysis is aimed at detecting whether there is assortative matching among members, that is whether two households are more likely to belong to the same association if they are similar along various dimensions (wealth, age, landholdings, ...).

Additional variables are constructed by the authors, such as an index of family ties of each household with the village authority, taking values from 0 (no links) to 4 (family ties to four different categories of village authorities). As regressors for the dyadic model, the authors construct three set of variables: distance variables, absolute differences in household characteristics, and sum of household characteristics. The first group includes a dummy indicating if the two household heads are of the same ethnic group and a variable indicating the physical distance between two households. This is constructed as the Euclidean distance between their grid coordinates on the plan that is included in the village survey. The two other groups include the absolute value of the difference (and the sum ) of the following variables for each pair of households: log number of members, female-headed dummy, age of the head, his/her education level, index of family ties with the authorities, log of owned land.

\textit{NGO survey by the authors Varun Gauri and Julia Galef on Bangladesh.}

This survey has been conducted in 2003 in Bangladesh and consists of two questionnaires administered at the NGO level. One questionnaire is submitted to the manager or director of the NGO, and the other to a focus group of randomly selected individuals in the immediate community where the NGO operates.

The level to which the questionnaires are administered is the one of local branches of NGOs, or of headquarters in case of small NGOs whose headquarters directly work within communities.

\textsuperscript{24} An indicator of relative wealth is also introduced, on 4 categories: it is the enumerator that has to classify households in the categories, since a single enumerator is carrying on the survey in the whole village.

\textsuperscript{25} A variable distinguishing by categories the share of who benefit from the VO is also used: the share of who benefits among the rich, the medium rich and the medium poor, and the same share among leaders and non-leaders.
Not all civil society organizations are involved\textsuperscript{26}, but only those who carry on “development” activities, “such as the provision of safe drinking water, sanitation, health care, adult and child education, agricultural training, roads construction, transport, skills training, land rights/tenure, credit, arsenic reduction, environmental work, employment generation, poverty reduction, advocacy in any of these areas, or other related topics.” (p. 2047). Awareness rising NGOs are also included. Branches of the Grameen Bank are not included, since they are not incorporated in the same legislation as NGOs.

The final number of observations is 310, but it is worth explaining how the sample has been designed. A first list of NGOs operating in the country has been constructed merging a list provided by the NGO Affairs Bureau (NAB) - registration in this list is a precondition to obtain foreign funding- with a list of members of the Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh (ADAB) and the list of the branches of the largest NGOs. The final list includes 6559 NGOs. On the basis of this list\textsuperscript{27}, a set of 35 thana\textsuperscript{28} is selected. In these 35 areas, the number of NGOs found in the list is 966, but this is completed by a first-hand census made on the field by enumerators and it raises to 1165\textsuperscript{29}. On the basis of this new population, a sample of organizations is selected via a stratified sampling procedure, in order to guarantee statistical significance on subsamples based on NGO size. These subsamples are: big NGOs that have over 1000 branches across the country (they are two: BRAC and ASA), big NGOs that conducted field operations in more centralized branches (Caritas and Proshika), and small NGOs. The reason of this sub-sampling is the willingness to isolate the four biggest NGOs (it is also the same classification used by the National Bureau of Statistics).

These data are used in the paper by Gauri and Galef (2005), in order to assess a picture of the NGO sector in Bangladesh. A first question that is addressed is where do NGOs concentrate with respect to income and wealth of different areas. in order to do this, authors use two measures: one is the average household income in the thanas, information that is extracted from the preliminary returns from the 2001 census (\url{http://www.bbs.gov.bd/PageWebMenuContent.aspx?MenuKey=<28}); the second is a measure of wealth constructed through the focus group questionnaire in the selected areas, where interviewed people were asked to tell the percentage of households in the community with television, cement floor and a resident member who is employed as wage worker.

Then, authors provide an account of different characteristics of Bangladeshi NGOs, starting from the activities they carry on. A second part is devoted to revenues, expenditures and resources, of which interviewed managers provide a detailed breakdown (moreover, almost all NGOs keep formal accounting): NGO revenue is decomposed into services fees, membership fees, sales (operational revenues), grants and donations (non-operational). An account of asset owned by the NGO as well as of physical equipment is done, as well as an assessment of human resources and staff composition: NGO staff is classified by job function and work status (part time/full time; salaried/volunteer).

On what concerns accountability, information is available on how NGOs take decisions and namely whether the headquarter is involved, which methods are used to assess needs, and to what extent the local community is involved in services provision. Other data are about registration in the government’s NAB and the existence of a supervising committee. Leadership mechanisms are

\textsuperscript{26} The full list of non-profit organizations or “social welfare” organizations is kept by the Department of Social Services and is longer than the one used to construct the dataset.

\textsuperscript{27} Probability of being drawn from the sample were proportional to the share of registered NGOs registered in the thana.

\textsuperscript{28} Local administrative units; the average number of NGOs per thana is 15.1, but they range from 1 to 192.

\textsuperscript{29} On average, the initial number of NGOs raised of 21% after the enumeration on the field.
assessed through socio-demographic information about the leaders: age, gender, nationality, education, social position, links with civil servants, previous experience, etc.

A final analysis done by the authors tries to explain the convergence towards a unique organizational form, that has the feature of relying overwhelmingly on credit activities, that are replicated in a “franchising approach”, where new NGO branches adopt the same procedures that prevail in pre-existing ones: authors argue that this can derive from staff incentives and thus analyze determinants of average salaries. Mean salary is constructed alternatively as the average staff salary, being the total NGO expenditure on salaries and allowances divided by the number of paid staff, and the manager-reported average salary paid to staff with a university degree (to measure professionals wage)\(^\text{30}\). Explanatory variables are, besides basic characteristics of NGOs (number of branches, number of staff,...), measures of size of credit activities (number of borrowers and size of loan portfolio). The main result is the positive correlation between average salary and size of the portfolio.

Survey on Pakistani NGOs carried on by Masooda Bano (2008).

The author collected data on 40 civil society organizations in Pakistan between 2003 and 2004. This is mainly a qualitative collection of data and it deals with the link of local non-profit organizations and international flows of aid\(^\text{31}\).

The aim of her study is to analyze the impact of development aid on organizations’ membership and performance. The sample, therefore, includes two types of organizations, distinguished by their source of funding: those the author defines as NGOs rely primarily on development aid; those who are defined as Voluntary Organizations (VOs) are outside the donor-funded chain and rely mainly on public donations and volunteers. Both are not organizations that work to safeguard the interests of their members: the focus of this paper is on organizations that “pursue a social mission driven by a commitment to share values” (p. 2300).

The organizations in the sample are selected as the most prominent cases in terms of scale of operation, annual budgets, funding levels and reputation among government officials, media and donors; the choice has been operated through discussion with staff members of 17 donor agencies, consultation of their funding reports, analysis of the reports on NGOs in Pakistan.

A semi-structured questionnaire has been administrated with chief executives of the selected 40 organizations and, when possible, has been integrated with annual budgets, discussion with members, organization reports, newsletters, ecc.

The main information available can be divided in three areas: social capital indicators, motivation (and ideological commitment), and organizational performance. The first is captured by the presence of local donors and of volunteers, as measures of the ability to mobilize local population. There is an evident lack of both capacities in NGOs with respect to VOs. Motivation is captured by leader’s salary and his “material sacrifice”, organization origin\(^\text{32}\), commitment to beneficiaries\(^\text{33}\).

Measures of material comfort are also added: does the organization headquarter is located in rich area of the town? Do they have 4x4 car? Etc.

\(^{30}\) These variables are also measured in small NGOs headquarters.

\(^{31}\) Another set of data collected by the same author is available, that is a set of interviews with over 300 respondents on their perception of the term “NGO” (Bano, 2005).

\(^{32}\) An organization origin can be the continuation of a donor’s project, desire to implement a development idea, response to a local need, address of a public problem.

\(^{33}\) Whether a local group of beneficiaries acted as a motive to build up the group and to define its aims, or decisions are taken and the beneficiaries chosen in order to match donors’ requirements.
The survey then analyses organizational performance of these organizations, that is –differently from project/outcome performance- “the organization’s ability to survive and stay focused on its stated vision” (p. 2302). The first question addressed is: are NGOs more empowerment-oriented than VOs, or it is just a matter of the discourse they adopted? Thus, an analysis of language used and of activities performed is carried out. How much each type of organization is focused on service delivery or advocacy activities is measured, and what is meant by advocacy is stated (how much “political” are advocacy claims). Agenda setting is also analyzed in order to measure the donors’ role in defining priorities; related to this, information on the NGO perceptions about donors is collected to see differences, among NGO themselves, across size and geographical location. Financial stability is studied through budget analysis, as a measure of sustainability and donors’ dependence. Finally, information is available on the social background of the leader s.

The datasets: information at the project level.

**DFID tenders, bids and contracts dataset, UK**

This dataset provides information on contracts between a public agency and private actors to run development projects. These data are derived by the competitive scoring auctions ran by the Department of International Development of Britain (DFID) and include information both on bids and on actual contracts that have been established between DFID and private partners; the dataset is constructed by Marieke Huysentruyt and used in a paper of her (2011).

Observations are the 457 contracts initiated between 1998 and 2003 and closed by August 2004 (the sample is exhaustive of the population of contracts in the defined span of time).

Information is available at two levels: the tender/contract and the bid level. At the contract level, the author collected information at the bidding stage: the Terms of Reference, that describe the work that has been put out for tender; the evaluation criteria the DFID adopts and the decision weight (e.g. a typically adopted criterion is the adherence to the Terms of Reference); the sector type the DFID classifies the contract in. Information on the contractual relationship after an organization actually won the auction are: initial price, ex-post renegotiated costs, actual duration of the project. For each bid that was submitted, the dataset includes the name of the organization that placed it, the percentage score on each of the evaluation criteria, the detailed information about the proposed costs (the breakdown in personnel fees, days of personnel input, project expenses), and whether the bid won.

The project have been ranked classifying the terms of reference along six dimensions: complexity of the work, precision with which the work is specified, the extent to which the terms of reference includes monitoring and evaluation, the extent to which the contractor must liaise and coordinate with many different parties, the extent to which the work relies on labour inputs, and the public goods nature of the work.

The organizations submitting the bids are 459 (all are distinct organizations and there are no joint bids, submitted by consortia); of these, 60% are for-profit organizations. In about 50% of the auctions only for-profit enterprises participated, il 17% only non-profit, while in the remaining, both for-profit and non-profit participated.

The main research question in Huysentruyt, 2011 is whether for-profit and non-profit systematically differ in bidding strategy and success. Main results are that the identity of the contractor matters: non-profit enterprises tend avoid contracts where Terms of Reference are more strict, and, on the contrary, dominate where labour input and public good component of the work are more relevant.
**Microfinance project funding: the Kiva platform.**

Kiva is an American NGO that offers a peer-to-peer microlending website: it connects individual lenders and “field partners”, that are microfinance NGOs that promote several entrepreneurial projects of borrowers mainly in developing countries. Lenders create an account and choose the project to finance by browsing the website. It is a kind of subsidized capital, since Kiva lenders only recover the loan principal without any interest.

Available data from Kiva are at the project level: I describe the data used in the paper by Ly and Mason (2012), that aims to assess the effect of competition for funding among projects on a measure of success in fundraising, that is the funding time (the time needed for a project to be fully funded).

The dataset that has been used by the authors includes 132495 projects between April 2007 and September 2009. It is not a panel dataset, since we have one single observation in time for each project, but observations are distributed along the aforementioned span of time. These projects are promoted by 150 field partners from 50 countries. The dataset doesn’t include expired projects, that are projects that aren’t fully funded 30 days after publication (then, in those cases, money goes back to lenders).

For each project we know its funding time (taken in log): the number of minutes it took to be fully funded from the moment it was posted. Characteristics of the projects are: loan amount and loan term, a variable indicating whether recipient is a group, a gender dummy, sector, country, and field partner who is promoting that project. An information on risk is provided, since Kiva rates project from one to five, where 5 means the lowest degree of risk.

The main competition measure is the number of projects that are raising funds at the moment project i was posted. For each project, the level of competition that it faces is therefore measured by the number of projects that were posted before or at the exact minute as it was and that, at the same time, were not fully funded by Kiva lenders. This measure is then refined by concentrating on “competing” projects of the same region, on the same sector, and proposed by the same field partner, in order to measure if competition among closer substitutes has greater effect on funding time.

Moreover, the dataset includes the possibility to test for the effect of two points in time, where Kiva media exposure exogenously increased.

The main result is that increasing competition increases the time needed to complete funding, thus decreases the marginal benefit of fundraising (matching therefore the theoretical predictions of Aldashev and Verdier, 2010). This effect is greater for projects that are closer substitutes. Media exposure, by increasing prospective lenders, allows projects to be funded faster, but –in case of an increase of publicity biased in favour of US based projects- this effect occurred just for US projects (in other areas of the world, the effect depends on competition).

**OECD Creditor Reporting System**

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34 133700 before data cleaning.
35 Authors mention that cases of expiration increased after the period that the analysis considered, but Kiva added the possibility to sort by “expiring soon”.
36 The sum of individual loans covers the whole requested amount.
The second database provided by the OECD (CRS: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=CRS1) keeps account of DAC countries aid activities: its source is the reporting of government agencies to OECD DAC. Data are available since 1995.

Non DAC countries report only on a voluntary basis. The dataset includes also International Organizations (World Bank, some UN agencies, the regional development banks and some other) aid activities and the activities of one private donor, that is Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

Information is available at the project level (the “aid activity”)\(^{37}\): project title, short and long description, donor country (or organization) and the agency within the country, recipient country, sector of intervention and purpose (sector’s subcategory)\(^{37}\), type of flow (ODA or different), channel, “type of aid”, the amount, whether this amount is in current or constant prices, and whether it is a commitment\(^{38}\) or a disbursement.

Sectors are divided as follows: social infrastructure and services (including education and health), economic infrastructure and services, production sectors, multi-sector and cross-cutting issues, commodity aid, actions related to debt, humanitarian aid, refugees’ assistance in donors’ countries, administrative costs of donors. Each activity has only one sector code.

“Type of flow” distinguishes between ODA and other channels, and –within ODA- between ODA grants, grant-like aid, and loans. Possible channels are public sector, NGO and civil society, public-private partnerships and multilateral organizations.

“Type of aid” includes: budget support, core contribution to NGOs, project-type interventions, experts and other technical assistance, scholarships and students costs in donors’ countries, debt relief, administrative costs.

DAC members’ multilateral aid (that is contributions to the regular budget of multilateral institutions), is excluded. Each activity has only one recipient, to avoid double counting, and activities that have more than one are classified by continent or region.

Since 1991, the adherence to a set of priority themes is also measured for each project: a score from 0 to 2 is given to each project, according to the extent they integrate each of the following issues: gender equality, environment, participatory development and good governance, trade development, biodiversity, climate mitigation, climate adaptation, desertification.

**Conclusions.**

This paper is a survey of the existing datasets on development NGOs. It is an ongoing work and will be updated regularly.

The selection of the datasets follows first of all the definition that I use for “development NGO”: an aid intermediary, a public good provider that channels donors’ funds. In this direction, I include both Northern and Southern NGOs to the extent they are part of the “aid value chain”, that through different steps channels money from donors to beneficiaries.

Of course, there is a “cloud” of literature that is at the borders of our focus and that is left out of this review. As an example, a dataset that is very close to our interest is the one collected by La Ferrara in 1999 (La Ferrara, 2002, Fafchamps & La Ferrara, 2011) on self-help groups in informal

\(^{37}\) It is presented on the website aggregated by data and year, but it is possible to view the disaggregation by project by clicking on each cell of the dataset.

\(^{38}\) A commitment is a firm written obligation by a government or official agency, backed by the appropriation or availability of the necessary funds, to provide resources of a specified amount under specified financial terms and conditions and for specified purposes for the benefit of a recipient country or a multilateral agency. (source: OECD)
settlements in Nairobi, Kenya: it is a survey among all members of a sample of self-help groups, that allows for a detailed analysis of groups’ composition.

On the side of international development NGOs and of aid channels, the main research questions that have been addressed in the empirical literature deal with the geographic concentration of NGOs in recipient countries, the correlation between NGO aid and Official Development Assistance, and more generally with the determinants of the allocation of aid across countries. The main factors that are assumed to influence aid allocation are recipient needs, economic and political interest of the donor, institutional environment and governance in the recipient country, public flows of aid and the localization of other NGOs.

In the analysis of aid allocation determinants, a frequent methodological problem is that data usually display a lot of zero observations. This may be dealt with in two main ways: first, a Tobit model, that implies the assumption that the choice of eligibility of a country and the choice of the amount to be disbursed occur simultaneously and are affected by the same factors (Berthelémy and Tichit, 2004, Nunnenkamp and Ohler, 2011, Dreher et al, 2012). Another option is to assume that NGOs decide first whether to intervene or not in a country and then decide the amount to be disbursed: in this case, a two step estimation with a Probit in the first stage has to be performed. The most common way to do this is using a Heckman selection model (Koch et al. 2009), that allows to take into account, in the second step, the information of the first. The problem with this method is the need to find an exclusion restriction. Neumayer (2002) suggests that, when the number of zeros is not too large, it is possible to perform a simple OLS after Probit. What often happens in these datasets is that zeros amount to more than the half of observations, that excludes this last solution.

The datasets at the NGO or project level have been mainly used to address research questions concerning the effect of competition for funding among NGOs and the difference between for-profit and non-profit in public tenders to run development projects. On what concerns NGOs in developing countries, the main issues addressed are somehow different: the determinants of the composition and membership, in particular the effect of donors sponsorship, the correlates of localization of NGO interventions, of their governance structures, of the characteristics of the leadership, and of the type of activities they carry on.

Some datasets allow for an analysis of time trends; this is the case for USAID and UK Charities Aid Foundation data; the same is true for OECD data, that, nevertheless, only include public funding to NGOs.

A specific problem occurs when data are self-reported, since it may be, as is underlined by some authors, that interviews represent a “model” rather than reality. When accounting data are available, cross-checking is possible. Using administrative data may allow to solve this problem of self-reporting, but, on the other hand, it creates a risk of selection bias.

A usual problem in NGO and civil society organization analysis is how to measure performance. On the Northern NGOs side, following “recipient need” and implementing projects in difficult institutional environments is generally considered to be desirable, but this is more often an implicit assumption. In the surveyed literature, I find some examples of how this issue is dealt with: in the case of Southern NGOs (Burkinabe and Senegalese datasets), performance is measured as the share of the village organizations’ members that declared (in the matched household survey) to have benefited from their participation in the organization (Bernard et al., 2008). On the Northern NGOs side (USAID dataset), NGO performance is proxied by the share of service expenditures (the expenditures for the “charitable” output provision itself) in total expenditures.

Finally, a drawback of the existing data on NGOs is the limited availability of matched information on Northern and Southern NGOs that are partners in joint projects. Some steps in this direction are
made in the Yearbook of International Organizations, where relational information is included, although this dataset presents some other limitations, mainly regarding selection bias and limited information on the detail of NGO expenditures. Another possibility to analyse the matching between organizations is to exploit the information provided by surveys on Southern NGOs, where information on donor sponsoring of local NGOs is available.

References.


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